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LAND CONDEMNATION: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY
OF NORTH DAKOTA STATUTORY LAW
DANIEL S. GuY*
I. INTRODUCTION. THE DARK CORNER OF THE LAW
These abuses have been fostered in the dark corner of the
law to which condemnation proceedings have been relegated.
The law of eminent domain falls outside the scope of most
law school curricula. This coupled with the fact the condem-
nation proceedings are technical statutory proceedings ex-
plains why most lawyers are ignorant both of the procedure
and the substantive law of condemnation.'
[I]n my opinion eminent domain laws in general were
conceived in darkness and ignorance, born of frustration
and futility, and were so stunted in growth as to never reach
maturity.
2
The above remarks are perhaps typical of the views of many
attorneys who become involved in condemnation proceedings. The
complexity and ambiguity of the many detailed statutes tend to
confound and frustrate not only the neophyte lawyer but also his
experienced colleagues at the bar.
Nor can the attorney any longer take refuge in the thought
that the area of eminent domain is of relatively little consequence
in the general practice, and thus can be safely ignored or shunted
aside. With the adoption of federal, state, and municipal legislation
proposing various improvements running the gamut from low-rent
housing units to highway construction, these proceedings are now
routine. Hardly an advance sheet reaches the lawyer's desk without
containing one or more decisions relating to eminent domain. Fur-
thermore, some of the state legislatures are belatedly taking action
to remedy statutes that were adopted as expedients in horse-and-
buggy days.
A. A CAPSULE OF HISTORY AND DEFINITIONS
The earliest recorded exercise of the power of eminent domain
was about 900 B.C. and resulted in the stoning to death of the
* Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, J.D., 1952, Ohio No., LL.M., 1956,
S.J.D., 1970, University of Michigan.
1. 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN. § 248 (2nd ed. 1953).
2. Shepard, Suggested Improvem6nts in Condemnation Laws, PROcEDINGS W.A.S.H.O.,
278 (1954).
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condemnee3 Hopefully, there has been considerable progress since
then.
The power of eminent domain was exercised by the Romans
in the construction of roads, aqueducts, and similar public works.
Not too much thought was given the subject in earlier days because
the rights of individuals were given scant recognition. It was only
when the rights of a person against the state became recognized
that it was necessary to analyze the power.
Hugo Grotius, the famous Dutch political philosopher and jurist,
is credited with originating the phrase "eminent domain" in 1625; 4
and it was copied by the Swiss, Vattel, in his Law of Nations in
1758.5 Without using the term at all, Blackstone included part of
one paragraph on the subject in his Commentaries, about 1765.6
Blackstone said, "All that the legislature does to oblige the owner
to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price."
The phrase "eminent domain" has never been rooted in English
law. At least as early as 1845, the terms "compulsory arbitration,"
"compulsory acquisition," or "compulsory purchase" had become
generally and permanently adopted.7 The 1929 edition of Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. II, pp. 1109, et seq., uses the heading, "Com-
pulsory Acquisition"; but the 1955 -edition of the same work, Vol.
10, pp. 3-268, uses the heading "Compulsory Purchase." These ex-
pressions tell us more about the nature of the power than does
the term "eminent domain."
In the earliest days of the American colonies there were no
roads. As the land was settled it was not difficult to locate "high-
ways" without any duty to the owner arising, as property had
very little value. Later, however, the colonies advanced to a state
where it became necessary to lay out roads through improved land,
and the right to compensation was recognized.
The first statute providing for the laying out of highways, and
securing to the owner damages appeared in Massachusetts in 1639.
New York recognized the owner's right to compensation in 1656
in an ordinance authorizing the location of streets in the cit 3
of New Amsterdam." In some of the colonies grants of land frory
the government reserved the right to take back six per cent fol
highway purposes. 1°
The power itself is as old as political society. It is inheren
3. 1 Kings 21 :19.
4. GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI AC PACIS, 385, 796-97, 807 (1925).
5. I. VATrEL, LAW OF NATIONS, ch. XX, § 244 (Chitty transl. 1883).
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. I, § 139.
7. The Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. ch. 18.
8. Ancient Charter and Laws of Massachusetts Bay, 126.
9. O'Callaghan's Laws and Ordinances of New Netherlands, 219.
10. McClenachan v. Curwen, 3 Yeates 362 (Pa. 1802).
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in sovereignty and requires no specific constitutional recognition.
It is not affirmatively mentioned in the Constitution of the United
States. Of course, we associate the federal power of eminent domain
with the fifth amendment, which provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without "just compensation." How-
ever this amendment does not create the power of eminent domain,
which is a legislative power, and its exercise in any given case
must be authorized by the legislature except as the constitution
directly grants this authority to other departments."
Just compensation is determined by the loss to the owner and
not by the gain to the condemnor. 2 The meaning of just compen-
sation is that the owner is to be put in as good a position as
he would have been if the property had not been taken."3 Fair
market value is the usual criterion for determining the loss to
the owner of the condemned property. 4
B. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
According to one commentator, the applicable constitutional lim-
itations may be divided into three categories: 5
(a) The federal government's power of eminent domain is ex-
pressly limited by the fifth amendment, which provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
(b) State constitutions commonly include the same limitation,
although differences may occur in the terminology.
(c) The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court as a federal protection
against arbitrary deprivation by the states of fundamental substan-
tive and procedural rights, requires states to observe the rule that
private property may not be expropriated except upon payment
of just compensation.-
Thus, while the fifth amendment serves as the relevant limita-
tion upon the federal government in eminent domain matters, both
the specific provisions of state constitutions and the fourteenth
amendment serve as limitations upon state power in this area.'17
The usual provision that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation is found in all but two
11. Kauper, Basic Principles of Eminent Domain, 35 MICH. ST. B.J. 10 (1956).
12. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) ; United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powel-
son, 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
13. Id.
14. Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924) ; United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369 (1943).
15, Eauper, 8upra note 11.
16. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
17. Professor Kauper points out, though, that the paucity of cases coming before the
nation's high court involving condemnation of property under authority of state law sug-
gest that the due process clause as a federal limitation adds little by way of constitutional
limitations not already afforded equally well under state law. Kauper, supra note 11.
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of our state constitutions."' In addition to this and the provision
that no man shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law, a number of other limitations have been placed upon the
exercises of the power of eminent domain by the various constitu-
tions. These include such requirements as the payment of compen-
sation in advance of the taking, a jury trial, provisions that prohibit
the setting off of benefits from the damages, and provisions that
the necessity of the taking shall be determined by the court or
in some cases by a jury.19
In the early part of the nineteenth century our citizens developed
a certain distrust for legislative action. As a result, the various
states began to write into their constititions provisions which would
prevent their legislatures from authorizing the taking of land for
public use without some assurance that compensation would be paid.
These provisions usually required that the compensation be paid
or secured before the property was taken. The first limitation of this
kind appeared in the Kentucky Constitution of 1792.20 In addition
to those states which have incorporated such requirements into
their fundamental law, many other jurisdictions' statutes specify
that the compensation must be paid before the property is taken.
Such provisions have had a marked effect on the methods of
condemnation now prevailing in our states. Since the compensation
had to be assessed by an impartial tribunal and paid in advance,
it became necessary to require the institution of proceedings by
the condemnor. Otherwise, if it were necessary for the owner of
the land to initiate proceedings to determine the compensation, he
might decide to postpone indefinitely the taking of his propery.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL METHODS
Irrespective of the technical distinctions found in the various
jurisdictions the existing law can be divided into two broad cate-
gories: administrative and judicial condemnation.
Procedurally, the administrative method is quite simple. The
condemnor files with the appropriate public official the designated
papers (plat of land, description of the contemplated improvement,
etc.) and tenders to the landowner or deposits in court an award
of compensation. At this juncture in the proceedings title and right
to possession vests in the condemnor. In the event the landowner
desires to contest the right to take the property or the amount
18. New Hampshire and North Carolina.
19. Dean Pound gives us some valuable insight into these various requirements in his
book R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW. 29-30 (1951).
20. KY. CONST. art. 12, § 12.
LAND CONDEMNATION SURVEY
of compensation he must assume the burden of commencing court
proceedings to determine these questions.2 1
The judicial approach requires the taking to be instituted by
a petition in court requesting that the right to take and compensation
due the affected landowner be determined. Notice of the commence-
ment of the condemnation proceedings is served upon the property
owner. The details vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
but frequently a preliminary estimate of damages is made by the
court appointed viewers, assessors, or commissioners with recourse
eventually to a jury. Title usually vests after the entry of an order
of condemnation and payment of the award. There is also a wide
variance from state to state concerning the time a condemnor may
first take possession of the property and devote it to its use.
22
In essence, the administrative method permits the vesting of
possession and/or title to property after the condemnor satisfies
certain requirements. From that point on the landowner has the
burden of instituting proceedings if he desires to contest the taking
or amount of compensation. Seven states2 3 employ the administra-
tive method: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode TIland, and Wisconsin.
The remaining jurisdictions condemn property via the so-called
judicial method, which basically entails the usual formal court pro-
ceedings terminating in a judgment of condemnation and an award
of compensation. In this* form of proceedings there is inherently
a lapse of time between the commencement of the action and the
final order of condemnation.
D. RELATED PROBLEMS
Before any project requiring the acquisition of land can be
undertaken, there must exist clear statutory authority to condemn.
This is simple enough for a sovereign state exercising the right
of eminent domain for a public purpose. Some statutes delegate
this authority to the condemnor as part of the general condemnation
law while others are specialized and restricted. Suffice it to say
that the only real difficulties in this area arise with special authori-
ties, districts, and other ad hoc units of government and quasi-public
corporations.
What legal estate may be taken in the condemned property?
It is clearly within the prerogative of the legislature to authorize
21. 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAN, § 24.112 (1972).
22. Id. § 24.113.
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-73 to 13a-77 (1958); MLE. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§
151-159 (1964) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 233
(1964) ; N.Y. HIWAY LAW, § 30 (McKinney, 1962) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 37-6 (1970)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32 (1978).
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the taking of a fee simple title, and there would seem to be sound
reasons for the acquisition of such an interest. However, in a few
states the policy body has decided to limit the legal interest to
an easement or to provide an option to the highway commissioner.
For example, in North Dakota the statute provides:
The Oommissioner, by order, on behalf of the state, and as
part of the cost of constructing, reconstructing, widening,
altering, changing, locating, relocating, aligning, realigning,
or maintaining a state highway, or of providing a temporary
road for public use, may purchase, acquire, take over, or
condemn under the right and power of eminent domain, for
the state, any and all lands in fee simple or such easements
thereof which he shall deem necessary for present public use,
either temporary or permanent, or which he may deem neces-
sary for reasonable future public use. .... 24
The real difficulty arises in those jurisdictions, nine in number,
where the statutes are silent on this point and frequently become
the source of litigation.2
5
With the increased tempo of condemnation work it is inevitable
that property will be required for the condemnor's purposes which
is already devoted to some public use. The pre-existing use may
be a public park, municipal golf course, cemetery, or a score of
other possibilities. These competing uses raise the problem of wheth-
er property may be condemned which is already devoted to a public
use. If the state is the condemnor and is condemning property
for one of its sovereign purposes, the fact that the desired property
is already devoted to a public use is no impediment to condem-
nation.26 On the other hand, the doctrine of prior public use is
applicable if the condemnor is a municipality or is private or qusi-
public in nature.
2 7
It is sometimes difficult to sever procedure from substance in
considering the procedural aspects of condemnation statutes and
suits. In addition we should note the preface by Mr. Nichols to
his second edition, where he stated: "Procedure is, however, a
difficult subject to handle in a work of this character, since it
is entirely statutory and no two states have the same statutes and
a single state frequently has entirely different statutes for condem-
nation for different purposes or by different municipalities." Recog-
nizing the difficulties involved, we shall analyze the condemnation
procedures of North Dakota and compare them with analogous pro-
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-18 (1970).
25. Delaware, Iowa, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Washington.
26. United States v. Cormack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
27. 2 P. NICHOLS, EMwnENT DOMAN § 2.2 (1972).
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visions found in the other states. First, however, a look at federal
condemnation procedures should be useful for background and com-
parison.
E. FEDERAL PROCEDURE
1. The Declaration of Taking Act
It was the vast quagmire of state procedures that brought
about the adoption of Rule 71A in 1951 as a part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to that, federal condemnation pro-
ceedings were required to conform to the procedural laws of the
particular states in which the lands happened to lie.
2 8
Before analyzing Rule 71A, there is an important federal statute,
the Declaration of Taking Act,2 which should be discussed. While
this act is substantive law, it has various procedural aspects.
In fact, Rule 71A (j) presupposes its existence.
The Declaration of Taking Act was modeled after the District
of Columbia law enacted two years earlier.30 It provides that the
condemnor may file with the petition, or at any time before judg-
ment, a declaration of taking stating that it is taken for the use
of the United States. The declaration must contain at least five
prescribed elements:
1. A statement of the authority under which and the public
use for which the lands are taken.
2. A description of the lands taken.
3. A plan showing the lands taken.
4. A statement of the estate or interest in the lands taken.
5. A statement of the sum of money estimated by the acquiring
authority to be just compensation for the land taken.
Title to the land or the interest when the declaration of taking
and a deposit of the estimated compensation made pursuant thereto
have been filed in court, to the use of the persons entitled to it,
described therein, vests in the United States, Thereafter, any de-
ficiency as between the amount of the deposit and the amount
later determined to have been the value of the property at that
time of the taking draws interest at six per cent. On proper appli-
cation, the court may order the deposited funds distributed to the
persons entitled, and may make any necessary orders respecting
28. 25 Stat. 357 (1888), 40 U.S.C. 258 (1946); see Comment, Condemnation In Federal
District Courts-Proposed Rule Compared to Current Practice in Ohio Under Conformity
Act, 10 OHIo ST. L.J. 65 (1949).
29. 40 U.S.C. § 258 a-f (1970) (originally enacted Act of February 26, 1931, 46 Stat.
1421, as amended Act of October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 797).
30. 45 Stat. 1415, repealed 40 U.S.C. § 370 (1970).
393
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possession. That the declaration of taking procedure is merely an
ancillary matter within the framework of an otherwise proper con-
demnation case, and that it may or may not be employed at the
option of the government follows from the principles already stated.81
In all instances in which the constitutionality of this act has
been questioned, its legality has been sustained. This would seem
to result from the rule that the constitutional requirement of just
compensation does not require that payment precede acquisition.
8 2
In United States v. Millerss the Supreme Court summarized the
purposes of the Federal Declaration of Taking Act:
1. To give the government immediate possession of the prop-
erty;
2. To give the landowner, if his title is clear, immediate cash
compensation to the extent of the government's estimate of the
value of the property;
3. To reduce the interest on the final award by relieving the
government from the burden of interest accruing on he sum deposit-
ed from the date of the deposit to the date of judgment.
2. Federal Rule 71A
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A, which governs condem-
nation proceedings in federal courts, was not promulgated until
1951. The delay of thirteen years was largely due to an extended
debate of whether the issue of just compensation should be tried
to a jury or to a commission.84 The draftsmen of the Rule did
not succeed in reconciling the differences, and it is fair to state
that as finally approved it represents a compromise of conflicting
viewpoints. Despite the lengthy debate the Advisory Committee on
Rules did agree that the conformity system 5 was "atrocious."8' 6
The Advisory Committee apparently also reached agreement with
little difficulty on certain statutory provisions which are essentially
the same in all jurisdictions. For example, the requirements as
to the contents of the petition or complaint and the provisions as
to service of process, including service by publication in certain
instances, are generally similar.
7
31. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
32. United States v. Eighty Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. 11. 1939) Hessel v.
A. Smith & Co., 15 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. IIl. 1936); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United
States, 85 F.2d 342 (App. D.C. 1936). cert. den., 299 U.S. 565 (1936).
33. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
24. Kennedy, Foreward (to Symposium on Eminent Domain), 43 IowA L. Rgv. 168
(1957-58).
35. Refer to text accompanying note 28, supra.
36. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 7837-40, 28 U.S.C. 71A (1970).




Rule 71 A does much to provide for a uniform system of pleading.
But it is also evident that the goal of uniform procedure in condem-
nation cases was not met. The most important subdivisions in this
respect are (h) and (k) .1 The discretion that Rule 71A (h) gives
the court to use either a jury or commissioners is in itself a denial
of uniformity. The usual approach in practice has been to use,
as far as convenient, the method in use in the state of the forum.s9
Furthermore, certain special statutes are excepted from the operation
of the rule. Examples of these are the proceedings in the District
of Columbia where valuations are fixed by a group of five freeholders
designated as a "jury" and selected by the court,40 and the com-
mission procedure used by the Tennessee Valley Authority.41
If possession is taken prior to the vesting of title, compensation
under Rule 71A is determined as of the date of the taking of
possession rather than of the date of vesting of title. In connection
with this, it should be noted that Rule 71A does not supercede
the Declaration of Taking Act.4
2
II. CONDEMNATION ACTS IN GENERAL
Initially, condemning authorities were created by special acts of
the legislature.4" Each act of incorporation listed the powers granted
to the new municipal or private corporation. With each grant of the
power of eminent domain the legislatures provided a distinctive pro-
cedure deemed appropriate to the condemnor. 4 Consequently, if
there were twenty special grants of the power to cities, turnpike
and railroad companies, and other public or private units, there
would be twenty different procedures.
38. (h) Trial. If the action involves the exercise of the power of eminent domain under
the law of the United States, any tribunal specially constituted by an Act of Congress
governing the case for the trial of the issue of just compensation shall be the tribunal for
the determination of that issue, but If there is no such specially constituted tribunal any
party may have a trial by jury of the issue of Just compensation by filing a demand there-
for within the time allowed for answer or within such further time as the court may fix,
unless the court in its discretion orders that, because of the character, location, or quantity
of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons in the Interest of justice, the issue
of compensation shall be determined by a commission of three persons appointed by it. If
a commission is appointed it shall have the powers of a master provided in subdivision (c)
of Rule 53 and proceedings before it shall be governed by the provisions of paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Rule 53. Its action and report shall be determined by a
majority and its findings and report shall have the effect, and be dealt with by the court
in accordance with the practice, prescribed in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Rule
53. Trial of all issues shall otherwise be by the court.
(k) Condemnation Under a State's Power of Eminent Domain. The practice as herein
prescribed governs in actions involving the exercise of the power of eminent domain under
th law of a state, provided that if the state law makes provisions for trial of any issue
by Jury, or for trial of the issue of compensation by jury or commission or both, that pro-
vision shall be followed. 28 U.S.C. § 71A (1970).
39. Paul, supra note 37, at 235.
40. D.C. CoD ANN. § 16-619 to 16-644 (1951).
41. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970).
42. 40 U.S.C. §§ 258A-258E (1970).
43. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 8a (1946).
44. RAy, CONDEMNATION PRoCDUPn 55 (1931).
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These special acts began to prove cumbersome and unwieldy
near the middle of the nineteenth century, and general acts pertain-
ing to different classes of corporations appeared as a more desirable
and convenient method of regulation. The evolution was gradual, but
we passed from a period when the procedure of extending the power
was by special act to each individual grantee into an era in which
the mode became one of general grant to all of a particular class.
45
At least one important problem has resulted from this historical
development. The rules of condemnation procedure are often treated
as substantive rather than procedural because they became rooted
in the substantive law during this period of growth. Many rules are
accepted without analysis instead of being evaluated in terms of how
effectively they assist in the enforcement of the substantive law.
An analysis of the state statutes reveals that there are at least
two basic ways in which the legislature has designated the procedure
to be followed in appropriating property. Both of these classifications
can be subdivided into various approaches, but for our purposes it
is sufficient that the procedure is determined either by the general
condemnation law of the state or by special acts.
Thirty-one states follow, in one form or another, the general con-
demnation law in condemning land.46 North Dakota is one of this
majority group.47
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. RIGHT OF ENTRY
If the landowner denies access to the land in question, how can
the condemnor proceed? He may not be able to file a condemnation
suit because in the absence of a survey he cannot ascertain precisely
what property he needs to appropriate, and he may be unable to gath-
er necessary information concerning the value of the land. Also, the
discovery rules would not be available in the absence of pending
lawsuits. It is clear that unauthorized entry for preliminary exam-
45. Id.
46. ALA. CODE tit. 19. 9 1-31 (1958): ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240-09.55.460 (1962); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1111 to 12-1128 (1956) ; CAL. CIrv. PRo. CODE § 1237-1266.2 (West 1972)
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-1to 50-1-21 (1963) ; DEL. 'CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6101-6115 (1953)
FLA. STAT. 73.012-73.021 (SUpD. 1974-75): GA. CODE ANN. tit. 36 (1970); HAWAii REV.
STAT. ch. 101 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE §§ 7-701 to 7-720 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47 (Smith-
'Hurd 1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. 3. -1701 to 3-1712 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. (" 472.1
(1971) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-501 to 26-511 (1973) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 38A (1970) MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 117.01 (Supp. 1974); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 2749-2782 (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. chs. 227 & 523 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. ch. 99 (1964) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-701 to 76-724 (1971) ; NEDV REV. STAT.
ch. 37 (1971) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (1969) ; N.D. CENT. CODE oh. 32-15 (1960) ; OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. ch. 163 (Page 1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, ch. 1 (supp. 1974) ; PEx.
REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 3264-3271 (1968), aS amended (Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE
ANN. oh. 94 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 54-2 (1966) ; WiS. STAT. ANN. ch. 32 (1973)
WyO. STAT. ANN. § 1-743 (1957).
47. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-15 (1960).
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ination and survey is at least a technical trespass. If the prospec-
tive damages will be more than nominal, such proceedings would
amount to a taking or damaging of property and formal appropria-
tion proceedings would be necessary.
48
A related matter is whether a condemnor which may be able to
send its agents onto the land to obtain data required for determining
where the proposed improvement will be located, can also have its
agents gather information concerning the value of the land. Usually
the owner will not object to either situation, perhaps because he is
optimistic at this early stage about obtaining a very favorable settle-
ment, but occasionally difficulties are encountered.4 9
Two basic types of statutes authorize entry by the condemnor
without first subjecting it to the payment of compensation. The more
popular provision authorizing such entry, found in North Dakota50
and twenty-one other states,"1 provides that the condemnor will be
liable for damages due to wantonness, negligence, malice or careless-
ness, or for actual damages while upon the land. (It is arguable of
course that the condemning authority would be liable for any dam-
ages due to the negligence of its agents or employees whether or
not a statute imposes such responsibility). The second type simply
states that agents of the condemning authority may enter upon the
land to make surveys and for other purposes. Thirteen states52 fall
in the second category. Fourteen other states 5 have no provision
authorizing entry.
B. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
Certain preliminary requirements must be satisfied before the
appropriation proceeding can be initiated under the laws of many
states. An important condition precedent which is found in the stat-
utes of fifteen states54 compels the condemnor to negotiate with the
48. 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 6.11 (1972).
49. Cf. Ary & Morgan, Problems of Access to Public Domain, State and Free Lands:
From Shotgun to the Courthouse, 15 RKY. MIN. L. INST. 481, 481-84 (1969).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-06 (1960).
51. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.280 (1962); CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1242 (West 1972); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-2-2 (1963) ; CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-60 (1958) ; HAWAII REV. STAT.
8 101-8 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE §8 7-705, 40-134 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-503
(Smith-Hurd 1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-118 (Burns 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-512
(1973) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:217 (1969) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 33a, 8 11 (1971);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9906 (1964) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.050 (1971); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-9-18 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. art. 9, § 136-120 (1974) ; ONLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, § 703 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-409 (Supp. 1974) ; TENN. CODE, ANN. § 23-1421
(1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-5 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-3a (1966) ; Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-754, 1-784 (1959).
52. ALA. CODE tit. 23, § 40-42 (1958) ; AaIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1115 (1956) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 117.041 (Supp. 1974) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 8023 (Supp. 1972) ; Mo. ANN. STAT.
227.120 (Vernon 1953) ; NER. REv. STAT. § 76-702 (1971) ; N.14. REV. STAT. ANN. §
229:11 (1964) ; N.Y. HIWAy LAW, § 3-30 (17) (McKinney 1962) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5517.01 (Page 1970) ; ORE. REV. STAT. 366.365 (1974) ; S.C. CODE ANN. 8 33-134 (1962)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 222 (1968) ; Ws. STAT. ANN. § 84.01 (1973).
53. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and Washington.
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landowner prior to instituting suit. A typical provision states that
there must be a bona fide effort to acquire the property by pur-
chase prior to the start of an appropriation proceeding. According
to a Virginia case,5 this means that negotiations must proceed far
enough to indicate the impossibility of reaching an agreement. The
court stated that this had been accomplished when an offer has been
made and rejected and there was every indication that the parties
would not agree on the price of the property. Some courts have held
that failure to negotiate with the landowner prior to instituting con-
demnation proceedings is a jurisdictional defect.56
North Dakota"' and seven other jurisdictions5 8 require that be-
fore the property may, be taken, it shall appear that the use to
which it is to be applied is authorized, the taking is necessary to
such use and if the property is already appropriated to a public
use, that this use is a more necessary public use.
As a part of the preliminary matters in ei'ght states59 the 'con-
demnor is required to file in the court and furnish to the landowner
designated papers such as a plat of the land and description of the
contemplated improvement. Of course, this is usually done as a mat-
ter of practice even without statutory fiat.
IV. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND PARTIES
A. COURT HAVING JURISDICTION
The question of which court has jurisdiction should be readily
determinable by checking the appropriate statute. However, as is
true in many other areas of the law of eminent domain, we find
that the provisions sometimes lack clarity and uniformity.
In most states the court of general jurisdiction of the county in
which the land is located has authority in condemnation proceedings.
However, six states ° provide a choice of some kind between dif-
ferent tribunals.
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 19:2 (1969)
ME. PEV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 155 (1964) ; MASS. GEN.. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 8A (1969):
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.366 (Supp. 1974) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 8023 (1972) ; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 523.010 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 32-3904 (1964) ; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-702 (1971) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-1 (1969) OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5519.01
(Page 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
3264(1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-99 (1970) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
55. Tiller v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 201 Va. 222, 110 S.E.2d 209 (1959).
56. See, e.g., Stalford v. Board cf County Comm'rs, 128 Colo. 441, 263 P.2d 436 (1953).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-05 (1960).
58. ALASICA STAT. § 09.55.270 (1962) ; AsiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1112 (1956) ; CAL.
Crv. PRO. CODE § 1241 (West 1972) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-704 (1948) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 93-9905 (1964) ; NEv. RrV. STAT. §§ 37.040 (1971) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-4 (1953).
59. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 76-534 through 76-541 (1957) ; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1247 (West
1972) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-57 (1958) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 19:2.1 (1969) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. ch. 117 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. HIWAY LAw § 90 (MeKinney 1962); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-111 (1974) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
60. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1702 (Burns 1968) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 2 (1971) ; Miss.
COD ANN. § 2750 (Supp. 1972) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5519.01 (Page 1970) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-1529 (1955) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
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B. PARTIES WHO MAY DEFEND
Generally speaking, the condemnor must sue as defendants all
parties having a sufficient interest in the property to entitle them to
compensation, and may rely on the record title in ascertaining such
parties. North Dakota6 ' and nineteen other states62 have provisions
relating to parties who may appear and defend, but it is quite likely
that the courts in the remaining states allow unnamed owners or
other persons showing good cause to intervene.63
North Dakota's section 32-15-20 is typical of several jurisdictions
in stating that:
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an in-
terest in, any of the property described in the complaint or
in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named,
may appear, plead, and defend, each in respect of his own
property or interest, or that claimed by him, in like manner
as if named in the complaint.
C. CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS
As more and more land involving adjacent or similar parcels
is condemned, consolidation of suits has become more common-
place. In many jurisdictions, the usual civil procedure provisions are
observed.6 4 In North Dakota6 5 and eighteen other states,66 however,
statutes provide that if one or both parties move for consolidation,
the court may in its discretion order the cases consolidated and tried
together for the convenience of the parties or to serve the ends of
justice. Five7 of these statutes further specify that the rights of
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-20 (1960).
62. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 15 (1958); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1120 (1956) ; CAL. CIrv.
PRO. CODE § 1246 (West 1972) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-5 and 50-1-12 (1963); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 79.051 (1964) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 101-15, 101-21 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE §
7-709 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, §§ 5, 11 (Smith-Hurd 1969); MD. ANN. CODE Rule
VII (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 23, 27 (1969); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN.
§ 213.372 (1967) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.020 (Vernon 1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-9910 (1964) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 37.080 (1971) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-47 (1953) ; N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 136-110 (1974) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 35.245 (Supp. 1979) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 1-506 (Supp. 1974) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-7 (1953).
63. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Wright ed. 1961),
Section 9 observes that some twenty-six jurisdictions have adopted the federal rules almost
verbatim and others have completed revised existing procedures, drawing heavily on the
federal rules. See also 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE H8
591604 (Wright ed.).
64. See 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 941-944 (Wright
ed. 1961).
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-19 (1960).
66. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 8 (1958); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1118 (1956) ; CAL. CIrv.
PRO. CODE §§ 1243, 1244 (West 1972) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-5 (1963) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 6104 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.021, 73.061 (1964) ; HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 101-17 (1968) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1702
(Burns 1968) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 154 (1964) ; MIss. CODE ANN. § 2772 (Supp.
1972) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.020 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 93-9908 (1964) ;
NEv. REV. STAT. 8 87.070 (1971) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970) ; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 37-6-22 (1970) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6 (1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 8.04.097 (1961).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-5 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 5 (Smith-Hurd
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each owner as to compensation or damages, or both, must be sep-
arately determined by the jury in its verdict.
D. WHO Is PLAINTIFF
In the numerous states having a judicial procedure the condem-
nor's position is usually compared to that of the plaintiff in civil
actions. Likewise in the seven administrative jurisdictions we find
that the owner's position is equated with that of plaintiff. This nat-
urally follows from the fact that the landowner must take the initia-
tive if he is to receive more than the condemnor's offer or deposit.
The foregoing sets forth the theory. It may be argued, however,
that the appropriating authority, the nominal plaintiff in most juris-
dictions, is actually in a similar position to the defendant in other
civil actions. No matter what procedures are followed, it is the land-
owner who is after the "top dollar." Moreover, the owner often in-
quires first on voir dire, goes first with the opening statement, pre-
sents his evidence first, and has the right to open and close argu.
ment .6 8
V. THE PLEADINGS
A. THE STATEMENT OF THE CONDEMNOR
The pleadings in condemnation actions are frequently more corn
plex than the pleadings required in other civil proceedings, increas
ing the risks encountered by the parties, attorneys, and courts.
In an administrative proceeding the taking is by order of a
agency and the owner is given a definite period of time in whic'
to file a claim for increased compensation. As noted earlier, seve
states utilize this approach. 69 The remaining forty-three states, ii
cluding North Dakota, follow a judicial procedure, authorizing tl
condemning authority, after disposing of preliminary matters, to fil
a petition, complaint, or similar pleading in court, asking that tl
property be appropriated. As in the usual civil case, this first pleal
ing, when properly filed with the appropriate court, gives jurisdi
tion over the proceedings to that court.
The content of the statement of the condemnor varies widely
the different jurisdictions. While no statute is typical, the North D
kota provision70 contains a number of requirements found in oth
1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.020 (Vernon 1953); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (P
1970) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.097 (1961).
68. Refer to section XII of this article, i nfra.
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13a-73 to 13a-77 (1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
§§ 151-159 (1964) ; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 79 (1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
(1964); N.Y. HIwAy LAw § 30 (McKinney 1962) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-6 (197
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 82 (1973).
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-18 (1960).
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states. North Dakota requires the complaint of the condemnor to con-
tain:
1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or per-
son in charge of the public use for which the property is
sought, who must be styled plaintiff;
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if
known, or a statement that they are unknown, who must be
styled defendants;
3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff;
4. If a right of way is sought, the complaint must show the
location, general route, and termini, and must be accompan-
ied with a map thereof so far as the same is involved in
the action or proceeding; and
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken and
whether the same includes the whole or only a part of an
entire parcel or tract.
The statutory provisions vary widely in their requirements as to
pleadings. Forty-two states7' including North Dakota, require a
description of the property to be taken, with some statutes specify-
ing that the land be "described with reasonable certainty." Eleven
7 2
of these forty-three specify that the particular interest or estate
sought must be spelled out.
The second most common allegation, found in North Dakota and
thirty other jurisdictions, 73 requires that the names and residences
of the owners and other parties claiming an interest in the property
be given in the complaint. Ten of these states,7 4 including North Da-
kota, provide that if the owners are unknown, there must be a state-
ment to that effect. Alabama and Ohio require an additional allega-
tion that reasonable diligence has been used to ascertain names of
owners.
Another popular allegation, required in twenty-three jurisdic-
71, ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 3 (1958) ; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1117 (1956) ; ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 76-533 (1957) ; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1244 (West 1972) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
50-1-2 (1963) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6105 (1953); FLA, STAT. ANN. § 73.021 (1964)
CA. CODE ANN. § 36-303, 36-304, and 36-313 (1970) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 101-16 (1968)
IDAHO CODE § 7-707 (1948) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1969); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 3-1702 (Burns 1968) IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.3 (1971) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-502
(1973); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 177.082 (1971) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:2.1 (1969);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23; § 154 (1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rule V 6 (1971) ; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § ch. 79, § 1 (1969) MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.366 (Supp. 1974) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. th. 117 (Supp. 1974) Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.010 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV.
COD ANN. § 93-9908 (1964) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 37.070 (1971) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §':22-9-42
(1953) ; N.Y. HrWAY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1962) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-103 (1974) ; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-15-18 (1960) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.01 (Page 1970) ; ORE. REV.
STAT. § 366.380 (1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1974) ; R.I. iGEN. LAWS
ANN. § 37-6-14 (1970) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-3 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §
23-1530 (1955) ; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3264 (1968) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6
(1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 224 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-101 (1970) ; WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 8.04.010 (1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-2 (1966) ; WIS. STAT. ANN.
6 32.05 (1973).
72. Alabama, Delaware. Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
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tions,7 5 is the use or purpose for which the property is to be taken.
Sometimes this is phrased differently, as Wisconsin's "nature of the
project." Related to this are other allegations affirmatively setting
forth the condemnor's name, authority, and right. Eleven states,7
including North Dakota, require the name and residence of the agen-
cy; ten jurisdictions 77 provide that the authority of the condemnor
must be set forth; and North Dakota and eight others78 have laws
that the appropriating authority must make a statement of right to
exercise the power of eminent domain.
B. THE ANSWER OF THE LANDOWNER
In the usual civil proceeding, the filing of a complaint normally
requires the filing of an answer or other response. However, con-
demnation statutes in most jurisdictions do not provide for the filing
of answers to the initial pleading of the condemnor. This may be due
in part to legislative oversight, 'but it is submitted that the inherent
nature of these cases, where there is normally just the one issue of
compensation, is an important factor.
73. AL. CODE tit. 19, § 3 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.010 through 09.05.020 (1962;
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1244 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-2 (1.963) ; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6105 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.021 (1964) ; HAWAI REV. STAT. §
101-15 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-707 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1702 (Burns 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.3 (1971) ; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 26-502 (1973) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:2.1 (1969) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
23,
§ 154 (1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE RULE V6 (1971) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.366 (SupP.
1974) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 117 (Supp. 1974) Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.010 (Vernon 1953) ;
MONT, REv. CODES ANN. § 93-9908 (1964) ; NEV. REv. STAT. § 37;070 (1971) ; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-9-42 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-103 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-18
(1960) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5519.01 (Page 1970) ; S.D.'CoMPiLED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-3
(1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1590 (1955) ; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8264 (1968) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-2 (1966) ; WTO. STAT. ANN.
Rule Ctv. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
74. Supra, note 5.
75. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 3 (1958); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-2 (1963) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 6105 (1953) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-16 (1968) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47,
§ 2 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1702 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. ,§ 472.3
(1971); Ky. R.EV. STAT. ANN. § 177.082 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19: 2.1 (1969);
MD. ANN. CODE Rule V 6 (1971) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 1 (1969) ; MicH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 213.366 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 117 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-9-42 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-103 (1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402
(SuPD. 1974); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 31-19-3 (1967); TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art.
8264 (1968) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 224 (1968) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.010
(1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-2 (1966) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. Rule CiV. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
76. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 3 (1958) ; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1117 (1956) ; CAL. Civ.
PRO. CODE § 1244 (West 1972) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-707 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1702
(Burns 1968) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9908 (1964) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 37-070 (1971) ;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-18 (1960) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1974); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-3 (1967) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6 (1953).
77. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-2 (1963) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6105 (1953) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 73.021 (1964) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1969); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 26-502 (1973) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.082 (1971) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-42
(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-103 (1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-402 (Supp. 1974)
WyO. STAT. ANN. Rule CiV. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
78. ARniz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1117 (1956) ; CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1244 (West 1972)
IDAHO CODE § 7-707 (1948) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2751 (Supp. 1972) ; MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-9908 (1964) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.070 (1971) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-18
(1960) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-6 (1953) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
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Seventeen states"" provide for answers, statements of defenses,
or statements of objections. Some match the California statute in
brevity: "Each owner must answer, setting forth his interest in the
property condemned and his claim for damages, if any"
North Dakota has no provision for an answer by the landowner.
However, both the Constitution of North Dakota and a statute in the
State Highway System chapter refer to the course of action the own-
er may take if he is unhappy with the deposit made by the condem-
nor. The Constitutional provision reads as follows:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having been first made to, or
paid into court for the owner. No right of way shall be ap-
propriated to the use of any corporation until full compen-
sation therefor be first made in money or ascertained and
paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which
compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury
be waived, provided however, that when the state or any of
its departments, agencies or political subdivisions seeks to
acquire right of way, it may take possession upon making
an offer to purchase and by depositing the amount of such
offer with the clerk of the district court of the county where-
in the right of way is located. The clerk shall immediately
notify the owner of such deposit. The owner may thereupon
appeal to the court in the manner provided by law, and
may have a jury trial, unless a jury be waived, to determine
the damages. 0
The statute is in accordance with this constitutional provision
and states:
Within thirty days after notice has been given in writing
to the landowner by the clerk of the district court that a de-
posit has been made for a taking of right of way as au-
thorized by section fourteen of the constitution, the owner
of the property taken may appeal to the district court by
serving a notice of appeal upon the acquiring agency, and
the matter shall be tried at the next regular or special term
of court with a jury unless a jury be waived, in the manner
-prescribed for trials under chapter 32-15 as amended. 81
In the context of state highway condemnation cases, these pro-
79. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1246 (West 1972) ; CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-3-8 (1963) ;
DEL. CODE: ANN. tit. 10, § 6107 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.051 (1964); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 101-34 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1707 (Burns 1968); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
177.085 (1971) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:450 (1969) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 155
(1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rule V8 (1971) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9910 (1964); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 37.083 (1971) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-45 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-106,
136-107 (1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.295 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406
(Supp. 1974) ; WyO. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959)
80. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14.
81. N.D. CENT. CoD t 24-01-22.1 (1970).
404 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
visions adequately specify the remedy for a dissatisfied landowner
in North Dakota.
VI. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
,It is well settled that in all proceedings involving the taking
of property due process requires that the owners, as a matter of
right, be afforded notice of the acquistion and an opportunity to
be heard with respect to the question of compensation. 82 Most juris-
dictions have rather detailed provisions covering process in condem-
nation cases. In fact, only Utah has failed to legislate on this subject.
Presumably the requirements applicable to other civil cases apply
in that state. In Alaska 3 and Illinois8 brief statements make clear
that service of summons and publication of notice shall be made
as in other civil cases.
The remaining forty-seven jurisdictions have statutes which vary
widely as to the time, form, and manner of giving notice. To add
to the complexity, provisions in twenty-nine states 5 impose certain
detailed requirements and then specify that in all other respects
the notice shall be like a summons in an ordinary civil action.
The usual provision as to the time for giving notice requires
that notice be given after filing of the first pleading. A typical
statute will require that upon filing of the complaint a summons
shall be issued, giving the owner at least ten days notice of the
time and place of hearing. As to the content of the notice or summons,
the most common requirement directs that the notice state the
time and place of hearing.
T-he manner of giving notice varies widely.8 6 Service by publica-
tion is authorized in twenty-three states8 7 as to non-residents, un-
82. 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 4.103 (1972).
83. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.05.010, 09.05-040 (1962).
84. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 4 (Smith-HIurd 1969).
85. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1119 (1956); ARN. STAT. ANN. § 76-533 (1957) ; CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 1245 (West 1972) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-4 (1963) ; DEL., CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 6106 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.031 (1964) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-708 (1948) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1703 and 3-1704 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.8 (1971) , KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.084 (1971) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:446 (1969) ; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 154 (1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rule V7 (1971) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 117
(Supp. 1974) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.030 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9909
(1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.075 (1971) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-4 (1969) ; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-9-44 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. SAT. § 136-103 (1974) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § .519.01
(Page 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, sec. 1203 (1969), as amended (Supp. 1973-74);
ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 35 & ch. 366 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-405 (Supp.
1974-75) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-8 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1530 (1955)
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3264 (1968) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
86. The purpose here it to be merely descriptive of what the statutes provide. It is
beyond the scope of this article to evaluate these procedures in terms of their meeting the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are serious questions re-
garding the adequacy of certain state statutes as the result of recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions unsettling the traditional notion that service by publicaion is adequate notice.
Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ; Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) ; Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
87. ALA. CODE tit. 19 §§ 4, 5 (1958) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-533 (1957) ; CoLo. REV. STAT.
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known owners, or, in Texas, an owner who secrets 'himself so
as to avoid service. Special provisions are found for service on
conservators, guardians, and personal representatives of persons
under disability and deceased persons.
North Dakota has no statutory provision, for notice in the chapter
on Eminent Domain.8 8 However, as seen in section V of this article,
both § 14 of the Constitution of North Dakota and N.D. Cent.
Code § 24-01-22.1 provide that the clerk of the district court must
notify the owner of the deposit by the condemnor entitled to take
possession of right-of-way under this "quick take" procedure.
VII. PRETRIAL PRACTICE
The term "pretrial conference" has different meanings in differ-
ent professional areas. Appraisers, attorneys, engineers, and right-
of-way agents often use conferences individually or in concert as
an informal means of developing information and correlating their
respective approaches or disciplines. Sometimes settlement confer-
ences between representatives of the landowner and the condemnor
are referred to as pretrial conferences. These and other types of
conferences are pretrial in the sense that they are held in advance
of trial. However, in this discussion a pretrial conference denotes
a strictly judicial proceeding held before a judge either in chambers
or in open court after the initial pleadings have 'been sued, the
purpose of which is to settle on or stipulate to all possible areas
of agreement in advance, to streamline the conduct of the trial.8 9
The usual concern relative to the use of pretrial conferences
in condemnation cases is that there may be little merit in using
the procedure where the basic issues are compensation for the
land taken and damages to the residue of the property. However,
these reservations are often dispelled by the introduction into the
case of such problems as boundary disputes, the necessity for taking
or the validity of the public purpose, fixture difficulties, and numer-
ous other issues that become part of many appropriation suits.
The pretrial procedure recommended by the District Court of
ANN. § 50-1-4 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6106 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.031
(1964) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-310 through 36-312 (1970) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-1703, 3-1704
(Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.12 (1971) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 154 (1964) ;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.373 (Supp. 1974-75) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 26, § 523.030 (Ver-
non 1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-42 (1953) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.01 (Page
1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ORE. REV. STAT. § 85.255 (Supp. 1973);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-405 (Supp. 1974) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-6-16 (1970) ; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-132 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-8 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-1530 (1955); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3264 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE §
8.04.020 (1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-3 (1966).
88. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15 (1960).
89. Naftalin, Pretrial Practice in State Condemnation Cases for Highway Purposes,
HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD BULLETIn 294, 16 (1964).
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Hennepin County, Minnesota, suggests some of the problems that
may be considered and disposed of in such a conference:
The following matters will be taken up and counsel will
be expected to be prepared with reference thereto.
.1. Stipulation as to the date of taking, legal description of
the parcels involved, description and extent of area taken and
the area remaining in each case.
2. All maps, pictures and exhibits of the parties to be mark-
ed and agreement of counsel obtained as to their admission
but reserving particular objections when agreement is not
possible.
3. Names of expert witnesses of all parties; the court will
limit the number of experts, to expedite the trial.
4. In cases involving different respondents having interest
in same parcel, determine the order of proof.
5. Stipulate as to zoning codes applicable, including setback,
use, et cetera.
6. Definite establishment of grade of highway and all serv-
ice or access roads.
7. Width of right-of-way.
8. Exact width of roads.
9. Width of pavement.
10. Number of roads, including service or access roads, width
of grade.
11. Direction of travel which will be permitted on all roads.
12. Exact position of all main and all service or access roads.
13. Exact position of ditches.
14. Exact depth, width and slope of ditches.
15. Exact position and size of all culverts and bridges.
16. Number, size and exact position of clover-leafs, over-pass-
es, and underpasses.
17. Exact position of slope easement and rates of slope.
18. Any other information the trial court deems pertinent.90
An ever increasing number of states have provided for pertrial
conferences in condemnation cases. At least twenty-two jurisdictions
use the practice to some extent. In most of these the practice
is discretionary. In about one-half of the states, the procedure is
limited in use to certain areas, usually large cities.91
The author's statutory survey revealed that only two states,
California and Florida, have provisions relating to pretial confer-
ences in eminent domain cases. 92 In addition, California by statute
90. Report of Comm. on Condemnation and Condemnation Procedures 157 (Municipal
Law Sec., ABA 1960).
91. Naftalin, supra note 89 at 18.
92. CAL. CirV. PRO. CODE, § 575 (West 1954) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.061 (1964).
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and Maryland by court rule refer to discovery in condemnation
proceedings.98
VIII. HEARING ON AND DETERMINATION OF THE NECESSITY
OF THE TAKING
It should be observed at the outset that two distinct situations
are embraced with necessity. The first involves whether a proposed
highway, urban renewal development, etc., is needed by the area.
The second relates to whether the certain parcel of land sought
is necessary for the construction of that project.
A whole line of cases 94 makes it clear that in the absence
of a constitutional provision or a statute to the contrary, determining
the necessity of the taking, what land shall be taken, and how
much, are matters within the discretion of the legislature. This
also holds true where the legislature has delegated to a governmental
agency such as the highway department the responsibility of select-
ing the property to be taken. However, if allegations of bad faith,
absence of discretion, or arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent action
are made, it usually becomes a problem for the courts. In such
cases the courts can overrule the condemning authority on the ques-
tion of necessity.9 5
The statutes conferring the power of eminent domain or contain-
ing the initial procedures omit any reference to the necessity of
the taking in thirty-six jurisdictions. 9 In most states, including
North Dakota, the right to decide what property is necessary is
vested by default in the condemning authority.
The agency usually has the initial duty of deciding whether
a proposed project is needed by the community and, if so, what
specific parcels are needed for the improvement. The next problem
arises when an interested party challenges the condemnor's location
or routing of the new development or highway because of fraud,
abuse of discretion, or other reasons.
A total of thirty-three states97 have made the final determination
of necessity a matter for the judiciary, assuming the issue is properly
raised. Of -these thirty-three, only Vermont spells out which party
has the burden of proof:
93. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1272 (West 1972) ; MD. ANN. CODE rule U12 (1971).
94. See Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878) ; Sleepy Hollow Valley Co. V.
McMorran, 20 N.Y.2d 190, 229 N.E.2d 32 (1967).
95. See, e.g., United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, 108 F. Supp. 545 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
96. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
97. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 4, 7 (1958) ; ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.300 (1962) ; ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. Hi 12-1116, 1121 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-536 (1957); COLO. RPv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 50-1-1, 50-1-6 (1963): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6107 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANNTq. § 73.071
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The burden of proof of the necessity of the taking shall be
upon the board and shall be established by -a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence, and the exercise of reasonable discre-
tion upon the part of the board shall not be presumed.""
IX. WHEN RIGHT TO DAMAGES ACCRUES
When property is taken in an appropriation suit a date of valua-
tion must be fixed because real estate values fluctuate, sometimes
markedly, over a relatively short period of time. The property owner
should receive the value as of this date of valuation, regardless
of any subsequent changes. There is agreement in the statutes as
to this principle, but it is on the exact time of valuation that different
viewpoints are found.
Initially it should be noted that twenty-four states99 have no
provisions on this important point. Three of these jurisdictions, Con-
necticut, New Hampshire, and New York, use the administrative
method of procedure, whereby title may vest in the condemnor
without any official sanction on the part of the court. We might
assume that under such a procedure the time for valuation is at
the time the property is taken by the administrative order. As
to the twenty-one states following the judicial approach, it is neces-
sary, of course, to analyze the case law to determine the date
of valuation.
Of the twenty-six jurisdictions, 10 including North Dakota, with
statutes, nine °1' use the date of the issuance of the summons. The
(1964) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-34 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-710 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-1705 (Burns 1968) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-504 (1973) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.086
(1971) : LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:447 (1969) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 22 (1969) ;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 219.368 (1967) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.075 (Supp. 1974) ; MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9911 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37-040 (1971) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
20:1-2 (1969) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-43 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-108 (1974) ; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ;j PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-406 (Supp. 1974) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-2 (1967) ; TEX. REV.
STAT. ANN. art. 3268 (1968) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-8 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
224 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. 9 25-46.17 (1973) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.070 (1961)
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-14 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
98. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 229 (Supp. 1974).
99. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
100. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.330 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1123 (1956); AR.
STAT. ANN. § 76-536 (1957); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1249 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 50-1-17 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6110 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071
(1964) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-24 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-712 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 3-1706 (Burns 1968) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:445 (1969) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 154 (1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 4 (1971) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 3,
12 (1969) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.369 (Supp. 1974) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-9913 (1964) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.120 (1971) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-9 (1969) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-9-52 (1953) ; NC. GEN. STAT. § 136-104 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §' 32-15-23
(1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-6-14 (1970) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 91-19-24
(1967) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 9§ 224-228 (1968):
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 82.05 (1973).
101. Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indira, Montana, Nevada, and Utah.
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statutes of Arizona, California, and Utah add that no improvements
upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons
shall be included in the assessment of compensation and damages.
Further, California and Nevada include provisions intended to dis-
courage the condeming authority from delaying the prosecution of
the action while the property is fluctuating in value, thus working
a possible hardship on the owner. California provides that if the
action is not tried in one year from the date it was commenced,
unless the delay is caused by the owner, then the value as of
the date of the trial controls. Nevada's approach states that if
the issue is not tried within two years after the date of the com-
mencement of the action, unless the delay is caused "primarily"
by the owner, the right to compensation and damages shall be
deemed to have accured at the date of service of summons or
at the date of the trial, whichever results in the greater compen-
sation and damages. Nevada defines "primarily" to mean the last
act of either party that would carry the action past two years.
New Jersey and New Mexico use the date the petition is filed
rather than the time the summons is issued.
In three states, the valuation as of the date of the trial is
an important factor. Colorado uses the time the condemnor is author-
ized to take possession, or the date of trial, whichever is earlier;
Florida determines compensation as of the time of trial, or the
date upon which title passes, whichever shall occur first; and Mary-
land looks to the time of the taking, if taking has occurred, or
to the date of trial, if taking has not occurred.
North Dakota's statute formerly provided that the value at the
date of the trial was the measure of compensation for property
actually taken and the basis of damages to the property not actually
taken. However, in 1969 this section was amended and now reads:
When right to damages accures.-For the purpose of assess-
ing compensation and damgaes the right thereto shall be
deemed to have accrued at the date of the taking and its
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensa-
tion for all property actually to be taken, and the basis of
damages to the property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases when such damages are allowed as pro-
vided in section 32-15-22. The time of the taking shall be de-
termined by the court.10 2
X. POSSESSION BY CONDEMNOR PENDING THE ACTION
Before the adoption of "quick take" procedure the condemnor
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-23 (Supp. 1973). The highway department's claim that pre-
amendment § 32-15-23 did not apply to it is discussed in White & Schlosser, Public Needs
and Private Rights: Eminent Domain and Land Condemnation in North Dakota, 38 N.D.L.
Rlv. 36, 50 (1962).
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in judicial states usually did not enter into possession and begin the
improvement until the compensation due the owner was assessed and
paid. This was true in practice even though the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Bragg v. Weaver,1 3 had stated:
It is settled by the decisions of this court that where ade-
quate provision is made for the certain payment of the com-
pensation without unreasonable delay the Taking does not
contravene due process of law in the sense of the Four-
teenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertain-
ment of what compensation is just.
10 4
The period of time which elapsed often ran into years, and this
lengthy delay in obtaining possession of the property was probably
the most serious defect incident to condemnation procedures in most
jurisdictions. The delay worked a hardship on the condemnor, who
could not go forward with the improvement; on the owner, who did
not receive payment for a lengthy period of time; and on the public,
which was deprived of the benefits received from a new development
or highway. Thus, the enactment of many immediate possession or
"quick take" constitutional provisions and statutes in recent years
has been of the greatest significance.
It may be appropriate at this point to review some of the high-
lights of the Federal Declaration of Taking Act'0 5 since this legis-
lation has served as a model for some of the states' "quick take"
provisions and has influenced many others. The condemnor, the
United States, may file with the condemnation petition, or at any
time before judgment, a declaration of taking, which contains a state-
ment of the authority under which and the public use for which the
lands are taken, a sufficient description of the property, a plan and
plot, a statement of the estate or interest in the lands taken, and
a statement of the sum of money estimated by the acquiring author-
ity to be just compensation for the land taken. When the declaration
of taking and a deposit of the estimated compensation have been
filed in court, to the use of the persons entitled to it, title to the
land, or the interest described therein, vests in the condemnor. There-
after, any deficiency as between the amount of the deposit and the
sum later determined to have been the value of the property at the
time of the taking draws interest at six per cent. On proper appli-
cation, the court may order the deposited funds distributed to the
persons entitled, and may make any necessary orders respecting
possession.
103. 251 U.S. 57 (1919).
104. Id. at 62.
105. Act of February 26, 1931, 46 Stat. 1421, aa amended 56 Stat. 797, 40 U.S.C. § 258 a-f
(1970). For more detail see § I. E., supra.
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In eleven states0 6 there are no immediate possession procedures
in the sense that the condemnor may obtain possession as soon as
proceedings are commenced. These jurisdictions, all two-layered
states wherein appeals are allowed from the report of the commis-
sioners to a court of general jurisdiction for the trial de novo, allow
the agency to obtain possession of the property after the commis-
sioners have assessed the damages and the authority has paid the
amount of this award into court for the owners. Delay is mitigated,
though not abolished, under such statutes.
In addition, there are the administrative states where title to
the property and the right to possession vests in the condemnor
without any action by a court or judge. After the award determined
by the condemning authority is filed with a specified official, the
agency has the right to immediate possession. It is the role of the
owner under this procedure to initiate judicial proceedings if he feels
aggrieved by the amount of damages awarded or by the taking it-
self. Thus, there is no need for so-called "quick take" provisions in
administrative jurisdictions. For many years, until the adoption by
most of the judicial states of the immediate possession device, this
aspect of the administrative method was its most distinguishing
characteristic.
Thirty states have "quick-take" statutes of one kind or another.
Of these thirty, eleven10 7 have provisions either identical with or close-
ly related to the Federal Declaration of Taking Act, whereupon the
filing of the declaration of taking and deposit of money in court to
the use of the owner, title to the property together with the right
to immediate possession thereof vests in the condemnor.
Eighteen states with quick-take provisions do not closely follow
the federal pattern.108 North Dakota and sixteen others of these states
specify when the condemnor may make a motion for a court order
permitting it to take possession and use the property pending the
106. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 18, 24 (f958) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1708 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 472.25 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
177.086 (1971) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.050 (Vernon 1953) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-711 (1971) ;
OKLA.' STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-140 (1962) ; TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3268 (1968) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §,230 (Supp. 1974).
107. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.380, 09.55.420 to 09.55.440 (1962) ; AnK. STAT. ANN. 9§ 76-534
to 76-541 (1957); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 74.011 to 74.091 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-6-2
(1970) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 101-28 to 101-30 1968) ; MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 213.367
to 213.371 (Supp. 1974) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7-22 (1969) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. 136-104
(1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-407 (Supp. 1974) ; S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-1S
(1967) W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-12 to 54-2-14 (1966).
108. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1116 (Supp. 1974); CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE §§ 1243.4 to
1243.7 (West 1972); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-6 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
6110 (1953) IDAHO CODE § 7-717 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, §§ 2.1 to 2.10 (Smith-
Hurd 1969) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:441, 48:448, 48:458 (1969) ; MD. ANN. CODE art.
33A, § 1 (1971) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 117 (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. J
99-9920 (1964) : NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.100 (1971) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-43 (1953) ; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960) and N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 14; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.275 (Supp.
1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1530 (Supp. 1974) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 !(1953)
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 8.04.090 to 8.04.094 (1961) Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-777 (1959).
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action. Most of these seventeen jurisdictions provide that the agency
may initiate the process at the time of filing the petition or at any
later time. The eighteenth state, Washington, presents a unique situ-
ation. The 1955 case of State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle 0 9 held that
a judicial determination of just compensation must be made before
possession can be taken. As a result, Washington statutes provide
that the court may enter an order granting to the state the imme-
diate possession of the property only if the owner agrees to it."'
As noted in Section V of this article, the North Dakota Constitu-
tion was amended in 1956 to provide for a "quick-take" procedure
when the state or any of its departments, agencies, or political sub-
divisions seeks to acquire right-of-way. 1 1 Although the general con-
demnation law, Chapter 32-15, does not provide an immediate pos-
session procedure, such an approach can be utilized by a state
agency pursuant to this constitutional provision. A "quick-take" by
the State Highway Department is provided for by statute."
2
XI. PREFERENCE FOR CONDEMNATION CASES
A serious problem in the administration of justice is the delay
between the time a case is instituted and the date it is tried. Con-
gested court calendars are the rule, rather than the exception, in
many jurisdictions. Delay is frequently a serious matter when the
litigants are private parties. When one of the parties is a unit of
government the difficulties are compounded since the public suffers
the consequences.
Substantial, sometimes enormous, values are involved in appro-
priation cases. The growth of communities and areas frequently de-
pends in significant measure upon the completion of urban renewal
projects, highways, and the like. In order that improvements of
great public benefit are not held up by the litigation of smaller pri-
vate claims, some states have accorded a court preference to con-
demnation proceedings.
It is usually in the best interests of both the condemnor and the
property owner to secure an early termination of the litigation. Even
in those jurisdictions which permit immediate possession by the con-
demnor, interest at the legal rate, from the date of possession until
compensation is finally fixed on the excess over that offered or de-
posited, often amounts to a considerable sum. From the position of
the owner, the longer he must wait before he is compensated for the
taking of his property, the more severe are the hardships which he
109. 46 Wash. 2d 166, 279 P.2d 645 (1955).
110. REv. CODE WASH. §§ 8.04.090-8.04.094 (1961).
111. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-22.1 (1970).
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may face. This is especially true in those states where he is unable
to withdraw at least partial compensation before trial. Moreover,
the proceedings freeze the market for, and the use of, his property.
Generally, improvements made subsequent to the date of commence-
ment of the suit are noncompensable. 113
There are at least two possible difficulties with the granting of
a court preference. First, the practice of granting preferential treat-
ment to different classes of litigation has reached the point where
the preference calendar in some courts may be as congested as the
normal trial docket. Also, with the acceleration of condemnation
projects in recent years, a state may have many suits pending at
the same time in various communities located throughout the juris-
diction. In many states only the Attorney General or one of his
assistants may represent public agencies or departments in court.
These officials would be hard pressed to handle the load properly
if pending cases were to reach the trial stage at the same time
such as early in the fall term.
Thirty-three states, 114 including North Dakota, have no provi-
sions relating to court preference. The remaining jurisdictions have
varying statutes difficult to classify.
Condemnation proceedings take precedence over all other causes
not involving the public interest in Arkansas, 115 Indiana," 6 and New
Mexico.1 17 South, Dakota 18 has a similar provision but limits it to
the immediate possession procedure of that jurisdiction. Mississippi"l9
uses the same language and adds "to the end that construction...
may not be unreasonably delayed." No statute defines public inter-
est.
California120 and Hawaii 2'1 give preference to eminent domain
actions over al other civil proceedings to the end that such actions
are quickly heard and determined. Arizona 2 2 and Wisconsin312 sim-
ply give precedence over other civil actions, while Colorado24 adds
"to assure that owners shall receive compensation . . . at the ear-
113. 1958 Highway Research Board Special Report 33 at 14.
114. Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana.
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wy-
oming.
115. ARxK. STAT. ANN. § 76-542 (1957).
116. IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-2956 (Burns 1968).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-49 (Supp. 1973).
118. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-3 (1967).
119. MISS. CODE ANN. § 8023 (Supp. 1972).
120. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1264 (West 1972).
121. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-9 (1968).
122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 12-1121(B) (Supp. 1974).
123. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-20 (1963).
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liest practical time and to reduce the interest obligation of petition-
ers....
Indiana 125 and Mississippi1 26 also have statutes specifying that
proceedings to acquire property for limited access highways shall
take precedence over all other causes not involving the public in-
terest to the end that provision of limited access facilities may be
expedited. Kentucky 127 and Ohio 28 have similar provisions regarding
limited access highways, but these states do not have laws giving
priority to cases involving nonlimited access roads and to other kinds
of comdemnation matters.
Three jurisdictions, Kansas,'129 South Carolina, 18 0 and Wiscon-
sin, 18 ' give priority to appeals in condemnation proceedings. Flor-
ida 38 2 requires that a jury be impaneled "as soon as practical," while
Maryland ss specifies that the case shall be set for trial in not
less than ten nor more than thirty days. Massachusetts8 4 provides
that the trial shall be advanced "so that it may be heard and de-
termined with as little delay as possible."
XII. ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION
A. INTRODUCTION
By and large, the trial of condemnation cases is similar to the
trial of other civil cases. It is true that, by statute or otherwise,
the "defendant" landowner often has the right to open and close in
voir dire questioning, opening statements, and argument to the jury
or other factfinder, but this may be only a tacit recognition that
owners, seeking the top amount of compensation, are in fact in the
role of plaintiffs in these proceedings. Normally a view of the prem-
ises is had, but this procedure is no novelty to the experienced at-
torney who has tried civil and criminal matters. The fact that there
is no burden of proof on either side in many jurisdictions is an in-
teresting twist, and the importance of detailed engineering testimony
in many appropriation cases may prove challenging to the neophyte
lawyer, but there are not as many difficulties involved in the actual
trial as might be supposed. As some judges like to phrase it, the
factfinder is merely an "assessing board" that listens to the engineer
present the construction details, views the premises (in some courts,
125. IND. STAT. ANN. § 36-3106 (Burns 1968).
126. Miss. CODE ANN. § 8039-06 (Supp. 1972).
127. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.260 (1971).
128. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5535.05 (Page 1970).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26.504 (1973).
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-139 (1962).
131. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071 (Supp. 1974).
133. MD. ANN. CODE Rule U14 (1971).
134. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 84 (1969).
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before any witnesses are heard), and analyzes the opinions of the
various real estate experts for the owner and the condemning au-
thority, respectively. Indeed, certain parts of the trial, such as the
court's instructions on the law, may be simpler than comparable
stages in a routine negligence suit.
Twenty-three states, 3 5 including North Dakota, provide that the
purpose is to conform the practice in condemnation proceedings, in
whole or in part, as near as practicable to that in other civil ac-
tions. Usually the language is similar to that of North Dakota:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the provisions of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to and con-
stitute the rules of practice in the proceedings mentioned in this
chapter."8 6
Although the better rule seems to be that there is no burden
of proof with reference to compensation for land taken,' 3 Louisiana
specifically places the burden of proving his claim on the owner.H
The other statutes are silent on this point.
Four states have provisions relating to the right to open and
close. California allows the owner to open and close arguments. 3 9
The owner in New Mexico has the burden of proceeding with the
case as well as the right to commence and conclude the argument.
40
Oregon requires the owner to open and close the argument to the
jury, and adds that the defendant owner may waive the opening
argument. The landowner in Wisconsin presents his testimony first
and has the right to close.'
4 1
B. VIEW OF THE PROPERTY
North Dakota 42 and eighteen other jurisdictions1 48 make no pro-
135. ASK. STAT. ANN. § 76-583 (1957); CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1256 (West 1972) COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1-6-50-1-10 (1963); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 101-11 (1968) IDAHO
CODE § 7-719 (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.081 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
48:454 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE Rule U3 (1957) ; MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 213.374-
213.379 (1967) MISS. CODE ANN. § 2769 (Supp. 1972) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9922
(1964) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.200 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-56 (Supp. 1973) ; N C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-114 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-33 (1960) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5519.02 (Page 1970) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.225 (1973) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-6-21
(1969) ; S.D. COMPiL LAWS ANN. § 31-19-12 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1532 (1974) ;
WASH: REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.110 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-7(b) (1966); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-33 (1960).
137. See Dept. of Public Works v. Dixon, 68 Il1. App. 2d 106, 215 N.E.2d 449 (1966) ; In
re Appropriation by the Dir. of Highways, 120 Ohio App. 273, 201 N.E.2d 889 (1963).
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:453 (1965).
139. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1256 (West 1972).
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-50 (Supp. 1978).
141. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.08 (1973).
142. North Dakota practice is to allow jury view. White & Schlosser, Public Needs and
Private Rights: Eminent Domain and Land Condemnation in North Dakota, 88 N.D. L.
REv. 36, 48-9 (1962).
143. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia. Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Washington.
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vision for viewing the premises by the factfinder. Of the thirty-one
states mentioning this procedure, nineteen'" specify that the com-
missioner, referee, board, or jury shall view the premises, land, or
property to be taken. These statutes may require the triers of fact
to "carefully inspect and view the property," or place them under
the charge of an officer of the court.
Five jurisdictions'1 45 provide that either party has a right to have
the factfinder view the premises. Of these, Oregon requires that the
motion for view of the premises be made before the formation of
the jury.
As to the use that can be made of the view, Delaware speci-
fies that the view by the commissioners is not considered as evi-
dence but is only for the purpose of better understanding the evi-
dence presented at the trial. 46 However, Maine provides that in mak-
ing its award, the Land Damages Board shall not be limited by the
range of testimony produced before it, but may reach its decision
on the basis of the view, the testimony, and its own judgment.1
47
The Montana court, in instructing the commissioners, states that
their duty is to determine the award due the owner solely upon the
basis of their examination of the lands, the evidence produced at
the hearings, and the insructions of the court."1
C. INSTRUCTIONS
Only seven statutes mention the instructions or the charge of
the court to the factfinder. At the conclusion the Colorado court shall
instruct the trier of the facts in writing as to the law.' 49 Delaware
simply states that after all the evidence is presented, the court
charges the commissioners as to the law. 50 After the Indiana ap-
praisers are sworn, the judge shall instruct them as to their duties
as such, and the measure of the damages and benefits, if any, they
144. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-10 (1963) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-76f t(1958) ;
IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.14 (1971) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-506 (1973) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 177.083 (1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 156 (Supp. 1974-75); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 117.085 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2759 (Supp. 1972): Mo. ANN. STAT. §
523.040 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9912 (Supp. 1974) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §
76-709 (1971) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:10 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-6 (1969);
OXILA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203, as amended (Supp. 1973-74); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1-501-1-514 (Supp. 1974-75) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 229 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. §
25-46.21 (1973) ; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 32.08 (1973) ; WYo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1
(1959).
145. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 9 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, ch.
79, § 22 (1969), as amended (Supp. 1974-75) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970),
as amended (1973 Supp.) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.315 (1973) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. J 54-2-8
(1966).
146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, as amended (Cum. Supp. 1970) § 6180 (1953).
147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 156 (Supp. 1974-75).
148. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9912 (Supp. 1974).
149. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-10 (1964).
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6108 (1953), as amended (Cum Supp. 1970).
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allow.151 In Kansas 52 and Wyoming 53 the judge instructs the ap-
praisers in writing as to the nature of their duties and authority,
and as to the basis, manner, and measure of ascertaining the value
of the land taken and the damages resulting therefrom. In Michigan
the judge instructs the jury or commissioners on questions of law
and admissibility of evidence.154 Finally, at the conclusion -of the
hearing in Montana, the court shall instruct the commissioners as
to the law applicable to their deliberations, and states that their
duty is to determine the compensation due the landowner solely upon
the basis of their examination of lands, the evidence produced at the
hearing, and the instructions of the court.155
D. VERDICT OR AwARD
Only Michigan spells out what documents the factfinder may con-
sider when it deliberates, stating that the court may allow the jury
to take with it any map, plan or other exhibit admitted in the case
as evidence.
156
Six states have time limits within which the factfinder must ar-
rive at a verdict or file its report. Maine specifies that "as promptly
as possible" after the conclusion of the hearing, the Land Damage
Board shall make an award.157 Wisconsin requires the commission
(when that procedure is utilized) to make its award within ten days
after the conclusion of ,the hearing. 58 The report of the commission-
ers in Montana must also be filed within, ten days after the com-
pletion of the hearing, but the court, upon a clear showing of ne-
cessity therefor, may allow additional time. 59 Alabama1 s0 and Kan-
sas' 6' require the commissioners to report their award to the court
within 20 days from the entry of the order appointing them. The
Kansas statute allows the judge to extend the time for filing for
good cause shown. Finally, the Minnesota provision requires the re-
port of the commissioners to be filed with the clerk of the district
court within 90 days from the date of the order appointing them,
although the court may, for cause shown, extend the time for mak-
ing and filing the report.162
As to how many factfinders must concur in order to reach a
151. MD. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706 (Burns 1968).
152. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-505 (1973).
153. WYO. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
154. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.377 (Supp. 1974-75).
155. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9912 (Supp. 1974).
156. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.379 (1967).
157. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 156 (Supp. 1974-75).
158. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.08 (1973).
159. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9914 (1964).
160. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 16 (1958).
161. VAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-504 (1973).
162. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.105 (Supp. 1973).
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report or verdict, ten jurisdictions16" have provisions. Seven6 " of these
involve three commissioners (assessors, viewers) as the triers of
fact, and all stipulate that the report of the commissioners, when
signed by a majority, shall be taken and considered as the report
of all. Montana and Pennsylvania add that if a majority does not
agree on a decision, that fact shall be reported to the court and
three new commissioners (viewers) shall be appointed.
Forty-one states,165 including North Dakota, have provisions rel-
ative to the form and content of the decision of the factfinder.
Twenty-three 66 of these specify that the report or verdict must in-
clude the fair market value of the property actually taken, together
with damages to the residue of the property. North Dakota's pro-
vision reads as follows:
Assessment of damages.-The jury, or court, or referee, if
a jury is waived, must hear such legal testimony as may
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings and there-
upon must ascertain and assess:
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned
and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty and
of each and every separate estate or interest therein. If it
consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and
each estate and interest therein shall be separately assessed;
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes
only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will ac-
crue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned
and the construction of the improvement in the manner pro-
posed by the plaintiff;
3. If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will
be damaged by the construction of the proposed improve-
ment, the amount of such damages;
4. If the property is taken or damaged by the state or
a public corporation, separately, how much the portion not
sought to be condemned and each estate or interest therein
will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the im-
provement proposed by the plaintiff, and if the benefit shall
be equal to the damages assessed under subsections 2 and 3,
the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation
except the value of the portion taken, but if the benefit shall
be less than the damages so assessed the former shall be
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6108 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1970) ; GA. CODE ANN. §
36-504 (1970) ; Law of April 15, 1971, oh. 520, § 12 Miss. LAWS 1714; Mo. ANN. STAT., §
523.050 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. PXV. CODES ANN. § 93-9914 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
20:1-10 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-512 (Supp. 1974-75) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.21
(1973) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-9 (1966) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 82.08 (1973).
164. Delaware, Georgia, Missouri, Montana, Ne* Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
165. ALA. CODE tit, 19, §§ 11-16 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.310 (1973); COLO. 1i~.
STAT. ANN. § 50-1-10 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.071, 73.081 (Supp. 1974-75) ; HA An
REV. STAT. § 101-23 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 7-711 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 9
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deducted from the latter and the remainder shall be the only
damages allowed in addition to the value of the portion taken;
5. As far as practicable, compensation must be assess-
ed separately for property actually taken and for damages to
that which is not taken.167
XIII. THE TRIBUNAL ASSESSING DAMAGES
A. IN GENERAL
A count of the different factfinders in the context of condemnation
statutes discloses that there are at least 76 tribunals in the first
instance. Tribunals on the second layer of double-layered judicial
procedures are not included in this tabulation as they will be consi-
dered in section XVII, supra. Juries, used in 26 jurisdictions, 168
commissioners, involved in 23,169 and courts, which serve as fact-
finders in 16 states,170 constitute a substantial majority. Referees
(Smlth-Hurd 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.14
(1971) ; AN. STAT. ANN. § 26-506 (1973) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.083 (1971); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:453 (1965) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 156, as amended, (Supp.
1974-75) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rule U19 (1971) MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 29 (1969)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.378 (1967) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.085 (Supp. 1973)
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2749-12 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.040 (Vernon 1953)
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9912, as am45nded (Supp. 1974) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §
76-710 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.110 (1973) ; N.H, REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:1-11, as
amended (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-9 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-43-
22-9-52 (Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-112 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1960) ;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5519.02, as amended (Supp. 1974), 5519.03 (Page 1970) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203, as amended (Supp. 1973-74) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-511
(Supp. 1974-75) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 37-6-21, 37-6-23.1 (1970) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §
33-135 (1962) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-16 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-153,
23-1537 (Supp. 1974) ; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3265 (1968), as amended (Cum.
Supp. 1974) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10 (1953) ; VT. CIV. PRO. RULES § 55 (1971) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. 8.04.110 (1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. 54-2-9 (1966) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. Rule
Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
166. Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1960).
168. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.300 (1973) ; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1122 (1956) ; ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 76-533 (1957) ; CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1248 (West 1972) ; COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 50-1-7 (1963) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.07 (1964) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-34
(1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-711 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; MD.
ANN. CODE Rule U15 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 22 (1969); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 213.375 (1967) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2749-07 (Supp. 1972) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §
87.110 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(38) (1953) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-13 (1960) ;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 35.225 (1974) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-517 (Supp. 1974) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-6-17 (1970) ; S.D. COm-
ParED LAWS ANN. § 31-19-12 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1532 (Supp. 1974) ; UTAHk CODE
ANN. § 78-34-10 (1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.080 (1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. 3
54-2-10 (1966) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
169. 169. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 11 (1958) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-1 (1963) ; DEL.
CODE: ANN. tit. 10, § 6108 (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 36-401 (1970) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1704
(Burns 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.4 (1971) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-504 (1973) ; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.083 (1952) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.075 (Supp. 1974) ; Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 523.040 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN § 93-9912 (1964) ; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-706 (1971) ; NEV. REV. STAT. 3 37.110 (1973) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 233:1 (1964) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-2 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-109 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-504 (Supp. 1974) ; TEx. REV. CIV. 'STAT.
ANN. art. 3264 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.19 (1973) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-5
(1966) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 22.05 (1973) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
170. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1122 (1956) ; CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1248 (West 1972)
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are found in five jurisdictions,'17 1 four of them west of the Mississippi
River; special boards are found in Maine,'17 2 South Carolina, 17 and
Vermont; 114 and masters are used in Alaska1 75 and Nevada.1 76
Commissioners are sometimes called assessors (Georgia), ap-
praisers (Indiana, Kansas, and Nebraska), or viewers (Pennsylva-
nia). However designated, this body is a small group (usually three)
of court appointees who informally view the property, hear the
testimony, assess the damages, and file a report with the court.
Some statutes allow appeals from the report to different, usually
higher, courts, while others require impaneling a jury in the
same court that received the commissioners' report.
North Dakota utilizes three factfinders. The North Dakota Cen-
tury Code begins as follows: "The jury, or court, or referee, if
a jury is waived, must hear such legal testimony as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings and thereupon must ascer-
tain and assess . 7. 1
B. SIZE
The most popular sizes for tribunals in the first instance are
12, three, and one. Of the 26 jurisdictions utilizing a jury, only
Colorado provides for a jury of six persons; however, the statute
allows a larger number on demand by any party to the proceeding.'78
Most provisions simply state "jury" without specifying the number
of jurors, but presumably the reference is to the traditional jury
of 12.
Commissioners play a role in the factfinding process in 23
states. 79 Eighteen jurisdictions provide for three commissioners. 8 0
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-1 (1963); IDAHO CODE § 7-711 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
47. § 10 (Smith-Hurd 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:4 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE Rule
U15 (1971) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 22 (1969) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
213.375, 213.378 (1967) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.110 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-48i (Supp.
1973); N.Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1962) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-520 (Supp. 1974) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-10 (1953) WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 8.04.080 (1961).
171. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1248 (West 1972) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-76 (1964);
IDAHO CODE § 7-711 (1948) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1960) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-34-10 (1953).
172. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 151 (1964).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-129 (1962).
174. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 229, 230 (Supp. 1974).
175. ALASxA STAT. § 09.55.300 (1973).
176. NEv. REV. STAT. § 97.110 (1973).
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1960).
178. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-7 (1963).
179. Statutes cited note 69 supra.
180. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 11 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6108 (1953) ; GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-401 to 402 (1970) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1704 (Burns 1968) KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 26-504 (1973) ; KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 177.083 (1952) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §1 117.075 (Supp.
1974) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.040 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-991Z (1964) ;
NE33. REV. STAT. § 76-706 (1971) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 238:1 (1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 20:1-2 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-109 (1974) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203
(1969) ; PA. STA. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-504 (Supp. 1974) ; TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3264
(1968) WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. P 4o. 71.1 (1959).
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Colorado181 requires not less than three; Virginia8 2 and West Vir-
ginia 83 use five, with Virginia also allowing nine; Iowa'8 requires
six; and Nevada 185 omits any reference to the number of commis-
sioners.
The 17 jurisdictions where the court serves as factfinder presum-
ably involve one-judge courts. 86 At least, there are no references
to three-judge courts in the statutes. In New York a single judge
of the Court of Claims hears the case without a jury. 7 By agree-
ment of all the parties, trials may be held before three-judge tribun-
als under some court rules. Although only 17 statutes specifically
provide for, trial by court, it may be had in many other jurisdictions
through waiver of the jury or by agreement of parties, assuming
no constitutional restrictions prevent it.
The five states using referees all speak in the singular of that
factfinder; and the same is true of the two provisions utilizing
masters.'88 As to the special boards, the Land Damage Board of
Maine consists of five members 8 9 and the Condemnation Board
of South Carolina provides for three, 90 but the statutes of Vermont
establishing such a factfinder omit any reference to the number
of members.' 91
C. SELECTION OF JURORS
Nine states have provisions relating in some degree to the selec-
tion of prospective jurors.192 Arkansas says simply that it shall
be a jury of 12 men; Colorado and Illinois provide that every party
interested in ascertaining compensation has the same right of chal-
lenge of jurors as in other civil cases; Maryland specifies that
the jury shall be selected as in other actions at law; Michigan
and Mississippi spell out the procedure on voir dire; North Dakota,
in its Section 32-15-14, and Washington allow the prospective jurors
to be summoned under a special venire; and Tennessee states that
a trial may be had before a petit jury as other civil actions are
tried.
D. DUTIES OF THE FACTFINDING TRIBUNALS AND THEIR COMPEN-
SATION
Clearly, the chief duty of the factfinding tribunal is to determine
181. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-1 (1963).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.20 (Supp. 1974).
183. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-5 (1966).
184. IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.4 (1971).
185. NEv. REV. STAT. § 37.110 (1973).
186. Statutes cited note 170 supra.
187. N.Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1962).
188. Statutes cited note 171 supra, as to references, and note 175 and 176, supra, as to
masters.
189. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152 (1964).
190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-129 (1962).
191. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 229 (1968).
192. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-533 (1957) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-9 (1963) ; ILL. ANN.
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the amount due the landowner. Other duties are secondary. Eighteen
jurisdictions"9 require that the factfinders take an oath or file an
affidavit before entering upon their duties.
Only four jurisdictions9 4 have express provisions relative to the
compensation the factfinders are entitled to receive for their services.
XIV. HEARING ON REPORT OR VERDICT
Only eleven jurisdictions 195 contain express provisions concern-
ing the action of the court on receiving the report of the assessing
body or the verdict of the jury. Where statutes exist they often
give the parties a right to file exceptions or objections to the report
or verdict after it is rendered. Usually a time limit is fixed within
which these exceptions may be filed, with the periods varying from
10 to 30 days. Frequently, it is provided that if no exceptions are
filed within the prescribed time, the report or verdict shall be
confirmed by the court and judgment entered thereon. In some
jurisdictions judgment shall be entered on the report or verdict
unless good cause be shown against it. It is a common practice
to allow the parties a jury trial on the filing of exceptions in states
where commissioners are utilized.
Provisions as to the power of the court have distinct differences.
Some courts have authority to enter such order as right and justice
may require, 9 6 while others are allowed only to set aside the report
or verdict and order a reassessment or a new trial.
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XV. FINAL ORDER, JUDGMENT, OR DECREE
In all condemnation proceedings there is a specific act which
vests the title to the property in the condemnor. In states employing
STAT. ch. 47, § 7 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; dE. ANN. CODE Rule U16 (1971) ; MICH. CoMP. LAW9
ANN. § 213.376 (1967); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2749-07 (SupP. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
32-15-13 to 14 (1960) ; TENN. CODE ANN. see. 23-1532 (Supp. 1974) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 8.04.080 (1961).
193. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 11, 13 and 16 (1958) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 36-403 (1970) ; ILL.
XNN. STAT. Ch. 47, § 8 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 472.7 (1971) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rule U16 (1971) MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
213.377 (1967) MISS. CODE ANN. § 2749-09 (Supp. 1972) MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-9912 (1964) NED. REV. STAT. § 76-708 (1971) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:4 (1964) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-9 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-109 (1974) OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-804 (Supp. 1974) ; TEX. REV. CrV I STAT.
ANN. art. 3264 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-7 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ.
Pro. 71.1 (1959).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, sec. 1-805 (Supp. 1974) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-131 (1962)
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3266 (1968) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-19 (1966).
195. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-76 (1964) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6108 (1953) ; FIA.
STAT. ANN. § 73.12 (1964) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 9 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ;, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 177.086 (1954) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.050 (Vernon 1953) ; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-9-52 (Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-109 (1974) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §
1203 (1969) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.21 (1973) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-2-10 to -11' (1966.
196. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.050 (Vernon 1953).




the administrative procedure the filing of the order of taking with
the appropriate official vests the title in the agency. Where the
proceedings are judicial in character, however, the vesting of title
does not occur until after the damages have been assessed and
a formal court order entered.
Thirty-nine states, 198 including North Dakota, have provisions
relating to final orders, judgments, or decrees. Of the 12 jurisdic-
tions 99 with no statutes, seven are administrative in character. Thus
only four judicial states-Kansas, Missouri, Tennessee, and Vermont
-do not have legislation on this subject.
In 21 jurisdictions20 0 a formal order, judgment, or decree of
condemnation vesting title in the condemnor is entered by the court
after the payment of damages to the owner or into court. These
provisions generally require that a copy of the order or judgment
be recorded as evidence of the condemning authority's title. North
Dakota's provision is typical:
When payments have been made as required in sections
32-15-25 and 32-15-26 the court must make a final order of con-
demnation, which must describe the property condemned and
the purposes of such condemnation. A copy of the order must
be filed in the office of the register of deeds of the county
and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the
plaintiff for the purposes therein specified.
20 1
198. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 16, 21, 24 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. 09.55.370 (1962) ; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1126 (Supp. 1974-75); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 76-537 (1957) ; CAL. CrV. PRO.
CODE § 1253 (West 1972) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-6 (1964) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
as amended (Supp. 1970) § 6108 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.101, 73.111 (Supp. 1974-75) .
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-606 (1970) ;IAWAIi REV. STAT. § 101-26 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-716
(1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 10, as amended (Supp. 1974) (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 3-1707 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 472.35-472.36 (1971); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 177.086 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:456 to 57 (1965); MD. ANN.
CODE Rules U21, U22 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 22, as amended (SupP.
1974-75) (1969) ; MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 213.381 (1967) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.205
(Supp. 1973) ; Mss. CODE ANN. § 2749-13 (Supp. 1972) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9919
(1964) ; NEB. REV. STAT. 8 76-712 (1971) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 37.160 (1973) ; N.JJ STAT. ANN.
§ 22-9-52 (Supp. 1973): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-116 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-27
(1960) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970), as ,amended (Supp. 1973) OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203, as amended (Supp. 1973-74) (1969) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.325
(1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-515, 1-517 (Supp. 1974-75) (1958) S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 31-19-18 (1967) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3266 (1968) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-15
(1953) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25.46.27 (1973) (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.120 (1961) ; W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-20 (1966) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-777 and Rule 71.1 (1959).
199. Connecticut. Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
200. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 16, 21, 24 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.370 (1962) ; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1126 (SupD. 1974-75) ; CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 1253 (West 1972) ; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-6 (1964) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.101, 73.111 (Supp. 1974-75) ; GA.
CODE ANN. § 36-606 (1970) ; 14AwAII REV. STAT. § 101-26 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 7-716
(1948), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47 § 10 (Smith-Hurd 1969), as amended (Supp. 1974) ; Ky.
REV. ANN. 177.086 (1969) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rules U21, U22 (1971) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §
117.205 (Supp. 1973), 117.17 (1964) ; MONT. REV..CODES ANN. § 93-9919 (1964) ; NEV. REV.
STAT. 8 87.160 (1973) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-26 (1969) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-52
(Supp. 1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-27 (1960) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.325 (1974) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 18-34-15 (1953) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-777 and Rule 71.1 (1959).
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-27 (1960).
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XVI. NEW TRIAL
Twenty jurisdictions 2 2 have statutes referring to the granting
of a new trial. Of these, 16 provisions 20 3 follow a definite pattern,
using language similar to that of North Dakota:
The provisions of this code relative to new trials and appeals,
except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions
of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned in this
chapter, but upon the payment of the damages assessed the
plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into, improve, .and hold
possession of the property sought to be condemned as provid-
ed in section 32-15-29 and to devote the same to the public
use in question, and no motion for a new trial or appeal after
such payment shall retard the contemplated improvement
in any manner. Any money which shall have been deposited,
as provided in section 31-15-29, shall be applied to the pay-
ment of the recovery upon a new trial and the remainder,
if there is any, shall be returned to the plaintiff.
20 4
It is probable that the general rules of civil procedure governing
new trials apply in most appropriation matters, whether or not
a specific reference is found.
North Dakota also provides that when a new trial has been
granted upon the application of the defendant (owner), and he fails
upon such trial to obtain greater compensation than was allowed






It is necessary to break down appeals into two distinct situations:
review of preliminary assessments and decisions of inferior tribunals
by courts of general jurisdictions; and review by the appellate courts.
The latter type of appeal is well known and generally understood.
The former, however, is subject to misunderstanding. Earlier discus-
sion has already made it clear that the first type of appeal is
of great significance in a considerable number of jurisdictions.
202. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1127 (1956) ; CAL. CIrv. PRO. CODE g, 1257 (West 1972)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-10 (1964) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6108 (1953), as amended
(Supp. 1970) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071 (Supp. 1974-75) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 36-601, (1970) ;
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-11 1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-719 (1948); LA. ReV. STAT. ANN. §
48:454 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE Rule U21 (1971) ; MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 213.381
(1967) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9922 (1964) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.200 (1973) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-9-56 (Supp. 1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-15-32 and 32-15-34 (1960) ;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970), as amended (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAwS
ANN. § 37-6-21 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-12 (1953) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.29
(1973) ; WYo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
203. California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wyoming.
204. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960).
205. N.D. CENr. CODE § 32-15-32 (SuPl. 1973).
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The legislatures of all the states have liberally granted the
right of review in civil actions; this approach has generally applied
to condemnation proceedings.
B. REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS AND DECISIONS OF IN-
FERIOR TRIBUNALS BY COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTIONS
Twenty-four states2 6 provide either for an appeal from a decision
of an inferior tribunal to the court of general jurisdiction; or, if
the general trial court has original jurisdiction over appropriation
proceedings but the first assessment is made by court-appointed
commissioners, that court has the authority to review such prelim-
inary assessments.
Frequently the second assessment is by a jury, which often satis-
fies the constitutional requirements of jurisdictions that the parties
shall be entitled to a jury trial.
C. REVIEW BY APPELLATE COURTS
The condemnation statutes of 14 states20 7 contain no provisions
covering review of proceedings by the appellate courts. Presumably,
the usual rules would apply in these jurisdictions.
Thirteen states208 are explicit in providing that the usual rules
governing review by the highest courts are applicable. The statutes
may specify that an appeal may be taken as in ordinary cases
or as in other civil actions. Others state that review is had in
the manner prescribed by law and in accordance with the appellate
rulei.
Another classification, consisting of North Dakota and 10 other
jurisdictions,20 9 may be designated the "usual rules apply except"
category. Such statutes generally provide that, except as otherwise
206. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 17 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.320 (1973) ; GA. CODE ANN. §
36-601 (1970) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1707 (Burns 1968) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.18 (1971) ;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-508 (1973) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.087 (1963) ; ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 157 (1964) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.145 (Supp. 1974) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §
2749-15 (Supp. 1972) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.050 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-9915 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. 76-715 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:17 (1964);
N.S.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-16 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-109 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-518 (Supp. 1974) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §
33-139 (1962) ; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3266 (1968) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
231 (1968) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-10 (1966) ; Wis. STAT. AN-N. § 32.05 (1973).
207. Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, New York, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
208. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 23 (1958) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1127 (1956) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 6108 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.131 (Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. 1
3-1705 (Burns 1968) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 12-108 (Supp. 1974) ; MICH. Co P. LAWS
ANN. § 213.368 (1967) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-719 (1971) ; OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02
(Page 1970) ; ORE. RIv. STAT. § 35.355 (1973) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 37-6-21 (1969)
S.D. CoMprIED LAWS ANN. § 21-35-20 (1967) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 232 (1968).
209. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1257 (West 1972) ; HAWAH REV. STAT. § 101-11 (1968) ; IDAHO
CODE § 7-719 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; NAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26-504, 26-508 (1973) ; K. REv. STAT. ANN. § 177.087 (1966) ; NEV. REv. STAT. §37.200 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-56 (Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-119 (1974)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960) ; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3268 (1968).
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provided in the act, all procedure in appropriation cases shall be
the same as in ordinary civil actions at law. North Dakota's provi-
sion is representative in stating:
The provisions of this code relative to new trials and appeals,
except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions
of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned in this
chapter .... 210
If this group is added to the straight "usual rules apply" classifi-
cation, one-half of the states utilize this basic approach.
Six jurisdictions2 11 set forth the appeal procedure plainly without
reference to the usual rules of practice, statutes, regulations, etc.
It is somewhat surprising to learn that only five statutes 2 2 spe-
cify the period of time within which an appeal may be taken.
On closer analysis, however, it is apparent that the substantial
majority of the states follow the usual appellate rules, some with
exceptions, or make no provision for review in their condemnation
statutes. Thus, the absence of time restrictions becomes somewhat
more understandable. Of the six periods mentioned in these five
provisions, three stipulate a limit of 30 days or one month, with
the others stating five days, 45 days, and six months.
Seven jurisdictions 212 have statutes relating to the effect of pay-
ment of or acceptance of the award on an appeal. Four of these
states stipulate that such payment or acceptance does not prejudice
a right to appeal. On the other hand, three jurisdictions specify
that the acceptance by the owner of the amount tendered operates
as an abandonment of the appeal.
XVIII. POSSESSION BY CONDEMNOR PENDING APPEAL
The effect of an appeal by, either of the parties must be consid-
ered here. A civil appeal ordinarily acts as a supersedeas or stay
of execution. In the absence of special statutory provision, then,
the condemnor could not take or continue in possession of the prop-
erty, pending final determination of the appeal, which might be
a long time. This delay would mean enormous additional costs in
the construction of an improvement.
In states following the administrative method, the right to pos-
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960).
211. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-76 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-516 (Supp. 1974) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (1953) ; WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 8.04.150 (1961) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
212. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6112 (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 12 (Smith-Hurd
1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-515 (Supp. 1974) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.150
(1961) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.131 (Supp. 1974) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 37.170 (1979) ; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 233:21 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-24 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.365
(1973) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-141 (1962) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.150 (1961).
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session of, and often the title to, the property vests in the condemnor
immediately after compliance with the statutory procedure. Also,
in the many states with "quick take" procedures, the condemning
authority can take possession of the land immediately. However,
neither in administrative nor in immediate possession jurisdictions
is the status of the title always clear. In all states, therefore, it
is important to know the effect of an appeal on the taking of
possession by the condemnor.
Thirty-one legislatures,214 including North Dakota,2 15 have stated
that appeals do not prevent condemnors from entering upon land
and beginning work or continuing with the improvement, frequently
with conditions, which will be discussed later. In addition, South
Carolina has adopted a unique approach:
In the case of an appeal by the Department the property may
not be entered by the Department, except for making surveys
and measurements, until such appeal is finally concluded.
But in the case of an appeal by a property owner, the Depart-
ment may immediately, after tendering to the owner the
amount of the award, proceed with the contemplated
work .... 216
It would be interesting to learn how frequently the South Carolina
agencies appeal condemnation awards.
Ten21 T of the 31 jurisdictions mentioned earlier impose no condi-
tions of entry. In the remaining 21 states statutes vary as to the
conditions upon which possession by the condemnor will be author-
ized. The provision most commonly found is that an appeal shall
not delay possession or work on the project if deposit in court
of the award has been made.2 1 8 It will be noted that North Dakota
requires payment of the damages, not just a deposit in court.21 9
214. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 18, 24 (1958); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.880, 09.55.460 (1973)
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1127 (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-539 (1957) ; CAL. CrV. PRO.
CODE § 1254 (West 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-14 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 13a-76 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73-131 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-602
(1970); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 101-32 1968); IDAHO CODE § 7-717 (1948) ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 47, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1705 (Burns 1968) IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 472.25 (1971) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48:459 (1965) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 12-108
(Supp. 1974) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.45 (1964) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 2749-15, (Supp. 1972) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.050 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9905 (1964) ; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-717 (1971) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 37.170 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-24
(1969) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960) ; OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page 1970) ;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969) ; ORE. RED. STAT. § 35.355 (1973) ; S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 21-35-20 (1967) ; TEx. REv. CIr. STAT. ANN. art. 8268 (1968) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-34-9 (1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.150 (1961).
215. Refer to section XVII of this article for N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960).
216. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-140 (1966).
217. Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas,
and Utah.
218. Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
Washington.
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-34 (1960).
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XIX. PAYMENT OF DAMAGES
The question of payment of the award is not as simple as
might first be imagined. Some of these issues were analyzed in
section X, supra, and will not be repeated here. To be considered
in this section are problems relating to the time after judgment
within which payment must be made; payment into court instead
of to the owner, when there are conflicting claimants or owners
under disability; percentage limitations on withdrawal by the owner
of the deposit in court; acceptance by the owner as abandonment
of defenses; and the effect of nonpayment by the condemnor.
Eighteen statutes220 fix a definite time within which the award
must be paid by the condemnor. Time intervals range from "at
once" after judgment (Maryland) and "upon the entry of judgment"
(Washington) to two years (Hawaii), but the most common period
is 30 days after the entry of final judgment, the time provided
in North Dakota and in eight other states.221
North Dakota and 21 other states222 provide that payments may
be made to the owners entitled thereto, or the award may be de-
posited in court for the owners and be distributed to those entitled
to it.
If there are conflicting claimants or it is otherwise unsafe or
impossible for the condemnor to make payment to the owners, 15
statutes provide for hearings, allowing the agency to deposit the
award in court until the dispute has been resolved or the unknown
or disabled owners provided for.223
220. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 25-27 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.350 (1962) ; CAL. Crv. PRO.
CODE § 1251 (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6113 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
73.141 (Supp. 1974) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 101-25, 101-31 (1968) IDAHO CODE § 7-714
(1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1707 (Burns 1968) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973);
MD. ANN. CODE Rule UJ23 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 36A (1969); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9917 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.140 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-15-25 (1960) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-13 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 230 (Cum.
Supp. 1974) ; WASH: REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.130, as amended (Supp. 1973) ; W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54-2-12 to 54-2-18 (1966).
221. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.350 (1962) ; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1251 (West 1972) ; IDAHO CODE
§ 7-714 (1948); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9917
(1964) ; NEV. REv. STAT. § 37.140 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-25 (1960) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-34-13 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 230 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
222. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.360 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1124 (1956); CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 1251 (West 1972) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-14 (1964) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 6110 (1953) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-31 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-715
(1948) ; MD. ANN. CODE Rule U23 (1971) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. eh. 79, § 6 (1969);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2749-14 (Supp. 1972) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9918 (1964) ; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:12 (1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-22 (Supp. 1974-75) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-15-26 (1960) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-521 (Supp. 1974-75) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 37-6-23 (1970) : S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-142 (1962) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
31-19-18 (1967); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3268, as amended (Cum. Supp. 1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-14 (1953) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973) ; WYO. STAT. ANN.
Rule 71.1 (1959).
223. ALA. CODE tit. 19, §§ 25-27 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6110 (1953) ; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 177.089 (1971) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.053 (Supp. 1974) ; MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-9912 (Supp. 1974-75) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.115 (1973) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 233:12-233:15 (1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-15 (1969) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-117
(1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-521 to 1-522 (Supp. 1974-75) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
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Seven jurisdictions224 have limitations on the amount to be with-
drawn by the owner, with a common provision stating that the
owner may withdraw 75 percent of the sum deposited in court
by the condemnor. Furthermore, 15 states225 specify whether payment
to the owner constitutes an abandonment of his defenses. North
Dakota provides that a payment to an owner shall be held an
abandonment by such owner of all defenses interposed by him,
except his claim for greater compensation. 226 This is a typical provi-
sion on this point.
XX. WRIT OF ASSISTANCE
After title passes to the condemnor, the owner may refuse to
surrender possession of the property or he may offer forcible re-
sistance to the entry of the condemning authority. Some provision
for placing the agency in possession is needed in such circumstances,
but only 17 jurisdictions 227 have statutes relating to this problem.
The Connecticut statute provides:
When . . . the amount of appraisal has been paid or se-
cured to be paid or deposited with the state treasurer, as
provided by law, any judge of the superior court may, upon
application and proof of such, payment or deposit, order
such clerk to issue an execution commanding the sheriff of
the county to put the parties entitled thereto into peaceable
possession of the land so condemned.
228
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have
somewhat similar provisions. They also put responsibility on the
sheriff of the county to place the condemnor in possession.
The statutes of Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
§ 37-6-23.1 (1970) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-142 (1962) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.27 (1973)
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 8.04.140 (1967) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-18 (1966).
224. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-6 (1964) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117-115 (Supp. 1973);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9920 (1964) ; NEE. REv. STAT. § 76-719.01 (1971) ; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 37-6-17 (1970) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-142 (1962) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
230 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
225. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6110 (1953) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-31 (1968) ; IDAHO
CODE § 7-717 (Supp. 1973) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1707 (Burns 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
26-510 (1978) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 158 (1964) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79,
§ 7G (1969) ; NEV. R V. STAT. § 87.100 (1973) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:21 (1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-43 (Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-105 (1974) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-15-29 (1960) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02, as amended (Supp. 1973) ; S.C
CODE ANN. § 33-142 (1962) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1533 (Supp. 1974).
226. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-29 (1960).
227 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. 1974) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.121 (Supp. 1974);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2.3 (Smith-Hurd 1969) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973) ; Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.086 (1952) ; Ms. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 157 (Supp. 1974) ; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 3 (1969) ; MicH. COMP. LAWS AN. §§ 213.371 and 213.382
(1967) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.055 (Vernon 1953) ; NE. REV. STAT. § 76-711 (1971) ; NEV.
REV. STAT. § 97.100 (1971) ; N.Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1962) ; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5519.03 (Page 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-407 (Supp. 1974) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1530 (Supp. 1974) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 32.05 (1973).
228. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-23 (Supp. 1974).
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sin, like the Connecticut provision, grant relief to the condemnor
after a deposit or payment has been made, but they do not state
which officer is responsible for implementing the order of the court.
Several laws-those of Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin-require that notice be given to the
owner. The time for notice varies from 48 hours in Wisconsin to 60
days in Ohio. The statute in Ohio is limited to the eviction of owners
or other occupants from structures.
The law of Florida authorizes the judge to grant such writs as
he thinks necessary to accomplish possession,- or he may use the
contempt power of the court. The Kansas provision is certainly the
shortest:
The plaintiff shall be entitled to all the remedies provided
by law for the securing of such possession.
229
Nevada adopts a different approach, authorizing the court to re-
strain the owner from hindering or interfering with the occupation
of the premises. New York authorizes removal of the owner or other
occupant in the same manner, before the same officer, and by the
same proceedings as in the case of a holdover tenant.
XXI. SPECIAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO LANDOWNER
At least 13 jurisdictions 230 have statutes involving inverse or re-
verse condemnation. One writer described inverse condemnation
as:
an eminent domain proceeding in which the property
owner brings suit to compel condemnation of his property.
281
Another commentator describes it as follows:
Inverse condemnation law deals with the problem of the
landowner whose land is not formally appropriated for high-
way purposes, but is subsequently damaged by the highway
improvement. In a typical case, the claimant's land is flood-
ed when the building of a highway disturbs the drainage
pattern. The highway agency could have met this problem
by compensating the landowner in the initial condemnation
proceeding, in this instance by condemning the necessary
flowage easement. Since it chose not to do so, the landowner
will be forced to an action for damages, based on the emi-
229. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973).
230. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1711 (Burns 1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 9, 10
(1969) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.090 (Vernon 1953) ; Ns. REv. STAT. § 76-705 (1971) N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-9-22 (Supp. 1973) ; N.Y. HIGHWAY LAW §. 30 (McKinney Supp. 1974) N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-111 (1974) ; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5517.01 (Page Supp. 1973) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (Supp. 1973) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-407 and 1-502 (Supp.
1974) VA. COD ANN. § 25-46-16 (1973) W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-39 (1966) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 32.10 (1973).
231. Austin, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid Off Pandora's Box? WASH.
L. R v. 920 n.2 (1965).
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nent domain clause of the constitution, in which he alleges
that his property has been taken or damaged without com-
pensation having been paid. Since the eminent domain clause
is invoked by the claimant rather than by the public agency,
the cause of action is called "inverse.
' 23 2
The Nebraska statute provides:
If any condemnor shall have taken or damaged property for
public use without instituting condemnation proceedings, the
condemnee, in addition to any other available remedy, may
file a petition with the county judge of the county where the
property or some part thereof is situated to have the dam-
ages ascertained and determined.
23
Massachusetts and West Virginia provide that a writ of mandamus
may issue to compel the agency to institute and prosecute to com-
pletion an appropriation proceeding for the purpose of determining
the amount, if any, due the owner.
If condemnation has been completed and the money is not paid
or deposited in court by the condemnor, 12 jurisdictions, 2 4 including
North Dakota, allow the owner to have execution. Most of these stat-
utes provide further that if the award cannot be made on execution
the court must set aside and annul the suit. North Dakota's pro-
vision is typical:
. . . If the money is not so paid or deposited, the defend-
ant may have execution as in civil actions, unless execu-
tion is stayed by order of the court pending a motion for
a new trial or on appeal, and if the money cannot be made
on execution, the court upon a showing to that effect must
set aside and annul the entire proceedings.
2 15
No statutes relate to substitute condemnation, but this concept
requires clarification. Where a landowner's access to bis property
is destroyed by construction of a road, certain jurisdictions allow the
highway department to acquire an easement over another's land for
the landowner's use. Some courts sanction this as minimizing dam-
ages to the owner, compensating him with something other than




232. D. MANDELKER, INVERSE CONDEMNATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrTS OF PUBLIC RE-
SPONSIRILITY (1964).
283. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-705 (1971).
235. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.360 (1973) ; ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1124 (1956) ; CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE § 1252 (West 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 74.091 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-604 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-25 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 7-715 (1948); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 523.040 (Vernon 1953) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9918 1964) ; NEV. REV.
STAT. § 37.150 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-26 (1960) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-14
(1959).
235. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-26 (1960).
236. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923) Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S.
362 (1930); Luke v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 337 Mass. 304, 149 N.E.2d 225
(1958); and Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Morgan, 253 Miss. 898, 175 So.2d 606
(1965).
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XXII. DISBURSEMENTS
A. COSTS
Twenty-seven237 statutes start with the proposition, stated direct-
ly or by implication, that the condemnor pays the costs of condem-
nation proceedings. It is often not clear whether the legislature intend-
ed to include appellate costs or only referred to the expenses of the
original assessment. Furthermore, there are frequently exceptions
to the above starting point to the effect that if the award is not in
excess of any offer made by the condemnor, then the costs must be
paid by the owner. Since as a practical matter the final award
normally exceeds the offer of the condemnor, 2 1 the owner in the
great percentage of cases does not pay the costs on the trial level.
Some methods provide that the condemnor shall pay the costs in
the trial court but the costs of an appeal are paid by the loser.
This type of provision might well discourage indiscriminate appeals.
North Dakota and eight other jurisdictions289 state that costs may
be allowed in the discretion of the court. North Dakota's statute
reads as follows:
The court may in its discretion award to the defendant rea-
sonable actual or statutory costs or both, which may include
interest from the time of taking except interest on the amount
of a deposit which is available for withdrawal without pre-
judice to right of appeal, costs on appeal, and reasonable
attorney's fees for all judicial proceedings. If the defendant
appeals and does not prevail, the costs on appeal may be
taxed against him. In all cases when a new trial has been
granted upon the application of the defendant and he has
failed upon such trial to obtain greater compensation than
was allowed him upon the first trial, the costs of such new
trial shall be taxed against him.
2 40
237. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 30d (1958) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-77 (1964) ; DEL. Com.
ANN. tit. 10, § 6111 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.091 (Supp. 1974-75) ; GA. CODE ANN. R
36-605 (1970) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.33 (1971) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973) ; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 157 (Supp. 1974-75) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 21A, § 12-107 (1973)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 8A (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.20 (Supp. 1973)
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2749-14 (Supp. 1972) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.070 (Vernon 1953) ; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-723 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233:25 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
20:1-13 (1969) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-59 (Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-119 (1974)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (Supp.
1973-74) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.346 (1973) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-519 (Supp. 1974-75) ;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1539 (Supp. 1974) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-9 (Supp. 1973) ; VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 233 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.33 (1973) ; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 8.04.080 (1961) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-16 (1966).
238. See D. Guy, STATE HIGHWAY CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES, Pt. III (Inst. of Con-
tinuing Legal Ed., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1971).
239. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1128 (Supp. 1974-75) ; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1255 (West
1972) ; IDAHO CODE § 7-718 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1709 (Burns 1968) ; MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 95-9921.1 (Supp. 1974) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.190 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-15-32 (Supp. 1973) ; WiS. STAT. ANN. § 32.05 (1973) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ.
Pro. 71.1 (1959).
240. N.D. CENT. CODE § 82-15-S2 (1960).
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B. FEES
Twenty-five statutes, 241 including North Dakota's, mention fees,
sometimes as a part of and sometimes independent of court costs.
These include attorney's fees, jury fees, appraisal fees, witness fees,
commissioners' fees, engineering fees, and an item in Virginia 242 for
a survey on behalf of the owner, such fee not to exceed one hundred
dollars. Oftentimes, these are required to be reasonable in amount.
C. INTEREST
Twenty-three statutes24 3 specify amounts of interest, ranging
from four percent in Indiana to seven percent in Nevada and
eight percent in Utah. Hawaii, Louisiana, and Virginia spell out
five percent as their interest rates, while the remaining 17 states
use six percent.
A more difficult issue concerns the point in time during condem-
nation proceedings when interest attaches. Thirteen states,24 4 includ-
ing North Dakota, allow interest to be calculated from the time of
the taking. Note that the North Dakota statute also provides that
interest is not allowed on the amount deposited in court by the con-
demnor and subject to withdrawal by the owner.
XXIII. ABANDONMENT OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS
Years ago, Professor Sunderland stated that:
241. ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1962) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1128 (Supp. 1974-75)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-76 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6111 (1953) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 73.131 (Supp. 1974-75); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-605 (1970) ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 47, § 10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.33 (1971) KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 26-505 (1973); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.083 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
157 (Supp. 1974-75) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 21A, § 12-107 (1973) ; MicH. COmp. LAWS ANN.
§ 213.383 (1967) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.20 (Supp. 1973) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 2749-14
(Supp. 1972) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-720 (1971) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-59 (Supp. 1973)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (Supp. 1973) ; OHIO RE-V. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Supp. 1973)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (Supp. 1973-74) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.346 (1973) ; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-519 (Supp. 1974-75) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.32 (1978) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 08.25.070 (Supp. 1973) WYo. STAT. ANN. Rule Civ. Pilo. 71.1 (1959).
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.32 (1973).
243. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.440 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-536 (1958) ; COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 50-1-19 (1964) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 74.061 (Supp. 1974-75); HAWAII REV.
STAT. 101-33 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 2.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 3-1707 (Burns 1968) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-511 (1973) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
177.087 (1971) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48:455 1965); MD. AN. CODE art. 21, § 12-107
(1978) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 8A (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 26, § 523.045
(Supp. 1974) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-711 (1971) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.175 (1973) ; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 27:7-22 (Supp. 1974-75) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-52 (Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-113 (1974) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 1-611 (Supp. 1974-75) ; S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 31.19-33 (1969) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1540 (Supp. 1974) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-34-9 (Supp. 1973) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.81 (1973).
244. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.330 (1962) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-536 (1958) ; COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 50-1-19 (1964) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-79 (1964) ; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 74.061 (Supp. 1974-75); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3.1707 (Burns 1968) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 177.087 (1971) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 157 (Supp. 1974-75) ; MIcH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 213.381 (1967) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9913 (Supp. 1974) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 136-113 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-32 (Supp. 1973) ; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.25
(1973).
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One of the most unsatisfactory features of our condemnation
statutes relates to the question of abandonment of the pro-
ceedings after they have been instituted.24 5
There is no doubt that his comment is still valid. First, a total
of 16 states24 6 have no provisions whatever on this important topic.
Second, the statutes that do exist vary greatly in scope and content,
and frequently fail to cover many facets of the problem. Although
they are difficult to classify, one approach is to inquire: (1) Is aban-
donment permitted and, if so, when? and (2) Under what conditions
is it permitted?
Eleven statutes provide, either directly or by implication, that
abandonment by the condemnor is allowed, but with restrictions.
247
Furthermore, 12 jurisdictions have provisions specifying the time
within which abandonment is sanctioned, or requiring that damages
be paid by the condemnor within a prescribed period on penalty
of dismissal of the proceedings if the payment is not duly made. 21
Sometimes the term "implied abaridonment" is used to designate
the situation where the condemning authority fails to make payments
within the required time.
If the condemnor abandons the project, the landowner may have
suffered substantial loss during the pendency of the proceedings.
He has probably hired an attorney and appraisers, incurred court
costs, been unable to make improvements on the property or sell
his land in a possible favorable market, and has otherwise been
greatly inconvenienced over an extended period of time. To remedy
this situation, Ntrth Dakota and 18 other states 2 9 have laws specify-
ing under what financial conditions abandonment is permitted.
North Dakota's statute, adopted in 1967, is perhaps representative
of these provisions in specifying:
245. Sunderland, 1st Report, Judicial Council of Michigan 23 (1931).
246. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
247. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1255a (West 1972) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1979); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 21, § 12-110 (1973) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, §§ 36, 43 (1969);
MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN'. § 213.390 (1967) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-22 (Supp. 1974) ; N.C.
GEP. STAT. § 136-54 (1974) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page Supp. 1973) ; S.D. COM-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 33-122 (1967) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. sec. 54-2-14 (1966) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. Rule Civ. Pro. 71.1 (1959).
248. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1865 (Supp. 1974) CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 1265a (West
1972) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6109 (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 10 (Smith-Hurd
1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1710 (Burns 1968); KAy. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1978); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 117.195 (Supp. 1974) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-711 to 76-712 (1971) ; NEV. REV.
STAT. § 37.180 (1973) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page Supp. 1973) ; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 35.335 (1973) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 8§ 1-408, 1-410 (Supp. 1974).
249. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1865 (Supp. 1974) ; CAL. CmV. PRO. CODE § 1255a (West
1972) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 101-27 (Supp. 1973) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 47, § 10 (Smith-Hurd
1969) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 472.34 (1971) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-507 (1973) ; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. 48:460 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 12-110 (1973); MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 213.390 (1967) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.195 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.180
(1973) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:1-30 (1969) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. art. 23, § 1-209.1. (1974) ; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-15-35 (Supp. 1973) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5519.02 (Page Supp. 1973) ;
ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.335 (1973) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-408 (Supp. 1974) ; S.C. CODH
ANN. § 33-122 (Supp. 1973).
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Whenever the state acting by and through its officers, depart-
ments or agencies, or -any municipality or political subdiv-
ision of this state acting by and through their officers, depart-
ments or agencies, or any public utility, corporation, associ-
ation or other -entity which has been granted the power of
eminent domain by the state, shall commence eminent do-
main proceedings against any land within this state and
thereafter withdraws or has such proceedings dismissed
without agreement of the defendant, the state, munic-
ipality, political subdivision, public utility, corporation, asso-
ciation, or entity commencing such eminent domain proceed-
ings shall be liable for and pay to the owner of such land,
all court costs, expenses, and fees including reasonable at-
torney fees as shall be determined by the court in which the
proceedings were filed.
250
XXIV. STATUTES PERMITTING THE ACQUISITION OF LAND
FOR FUTURE HIGHWAY USE
Thirty states,2 5 1 including North Dakota, have provisions either
directly or by implication allowing the acquisition of property for
future highway purposes.
Before turning to these statutes it may be best to consider
the several pros and cons of the device. The Highway Research
Board has summarized the advantages of acquiring lands for future
highway use as follows:
(1) Advance acquisition of right-of-way facilitates the order-
ly planning of a comprehensive system of arterial highways,
well in advance of construction, and with the full assurance
that the alignment of these future* arterials will be fully pro-
tected pending future construction.
(2) At the same time, it makes possible large monetary sav-
ings in the costs of future highway rights-of-ways, by fore-
stalling private development of such lands. Such savings can
range from $5 to $30 for every dollar invested in future high-
way right-of-way.
(3) Advance acquisition of land diminishes economic waste
of all kinds (both public and private) which occurs when
250. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-35 (Supp. 1973).
251. ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.040 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1865 (Supp. 1974)
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-532 (1957) ; CAL. STREETS & HIGHWAYS CODE § 104.6 (West 1969)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-3-10 (1963) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-79 (1964) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 337.27 (1968) ; IDAHO CODE § 40-120 (1968) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-510
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-2947 (Burns Supp. 1972) ; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 68-423 (1972) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:220 (1969) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 8 (1969) ;
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 247.663a (1967) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 32-3902, 32-3903,
and 32-3906 (Supp. 1974) NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1320 and 89-1321 (1968) ; NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 408.970 (1973) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-22 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-41
(Supp. 1973) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1974) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-18 (1970) ; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5501.112 (Page 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1203 (1969); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 35.385 (Supp. 1973) ; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art..6,674 n-i (1969) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 27-12-96 (1969) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 222 (1968) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§
83.1-89 to 33.1-90 (Supp. 1974) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.12.180 (1970) ; W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 17-2A-17 (1974).
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rights-of-way are acquired after private building improve-
ments have been made in a particular area.
(4) Construction costs of an arterial highway system will
invariable be less when new streets that serve a new sub-
division or other commercial or industrial development are
designed and integrated, physically and functionally, with
the arterial system.
(5) Acquisition of land for future use enables local planning
agencies to establish more effective zoning of the areas serv-
ed by highway facilities, and otherwise assists the more order-
ly planning of the entire area.
(6) It will also keep to a minimum the number of people
who will be discommoded by a future highway improvement,
by preventing conditions from arising whereby owners and
tenants of private installations must seek to located elsewhere
because they had no knowledge of a future highway improve-
ment and its impact on their private properties.
(7) By like token it will reduce the controversial aspects
which often characterize a new arterial highway proposal.
This is especially true in residential areas.
(8) Acquisition of right-of-way for future use prevents the
automatic pyramiding of land values in advance of right-of-
way acquisition, which is often the case when right-of-way is
acquired shortly before construction starts. Such values are
enhanced because of the anticipated benefits which invariably
occur when a transportation facility of modern design is
established in a particular area.
(9) Acquisition for future use stimulates advance engineer-
ing planning and design on the part of the highway depart-
ment, and thereby makes possible a much more rational and
deliberate approach to the problem of providing a modern
highway plant.
252
However, there are also some possible shortcomings in acquiring
lands for future use. For example, if land is acquired today for
use at a later date, it is conceivable that the property may have
been acquired in a high market, which would diminish potential
savings inherent in the advance acquisition mechanism. Also, unless
such a program is predicated upon an engineering plan for the
development of the route in question, unwise commitments may
be made. Furthermore, advance acquisition of lands may afford
increased opportunities for fraud and corruption.
253
Twenty-seven states254 have statutes directly authorizing advance
acquistion of property. North Dakota's statute is limited in scope
252. Highway Research Board Special Report 27, at 2 (1957).
253. For a detailed analysis see Highway Research Board Special Report 27 (1957); a
more recent study is House Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Advance Acqui-
sition of Mghway Rights-of-Way (Comm. Print No. 8, 1967).
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to the state highway system but otherwise is a fair example of
this class in specifying:
The [state highway] commissioner . . may purchase, ac-
quire, take over, or condemn under the right and power of
eminent domain, for the state, any and all lands in fee simple
or such easements thereof which he shall deem necessary
for present public use, either temporary or permanent, or
which he may deem necessary for reasonable future public
use .... 255
At least three states256 have provisions which, by implication,
allow acquisition of property for future highway use. The Oregon
approach can serve as an illustration:
Whenever it becomes necessary to acquire any real property
for use in connection with the location, relocation, construc-
tion, reconstruction, improvement and maintenance of any
throughway or section thereof or for a service road, the State
Highway Commission may, in its discretion, acquire an entire
lot, block or tract of land if by so doing the interests of the
owner and the state will be best served, even though the




As compared with the ambiguous, horse-and-buggy statutes, and
two-level judicial procedures of many other states, North Dakota's
eminent domain code is, for the most part, fairly well organized,
understandable, and reasonably up-to-date. However, a few com-
ments may be in order.
What is the nature of the legal interest obtained by condemna-
tion? The Century Code allows the State Highway Commissioner some
discretion in highway matters, 258 but Chapter 32-15 is silent as to
whether a mere easement or a fee simple title is acquired. The at-
254. ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.040 (1962); ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1865 (Supp. 1973);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-532 (1957) ; CAL. STREETS & HIGHWAYS CODE § 104.6 (West Supp.
1974) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-3-10 (1964) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-79 (1964) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 337.27 (1968) IDAHO CODE § 40-120 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, §
4-510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-2947 (Burns Supp. 1972); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 68-423 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:220 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art.
89B, § 8 (Supp. 1973) ; MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 247.663a (Supp. 1974-75) ; MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 32-3902, 32-3903, 32-3906 (Supp. 1974) ; NED. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1320, 39-1321
(1968) ; NEV. REV. STAT. 408.970 (1973) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-22 (Supp. 1974-75) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-9-41 (Supp. 1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-18 (1970) ; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5501.112 (Page 1970) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 96, § 1203 (Supp. 1973-74) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 27-12-96 (1969) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 222 (SuPp. 1974) ; VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 33.1-89 (1970) ; 33.1-90 (Supp. 1974) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.12.180 (1970) ; W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 17-2A-17 (1974).
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-18 (1970).
256. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1974) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 374.040 (1974) ; TEx. REV. Cry.
STAT. ANN. art. 6674n (1969).
257. ORE. REV. STAT. § 374.040 (1974).
258. N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-18 (1970).
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torneys for the condemning authorities express doubt concerning this
issue, which becomes a pracical problem when military installations,
railroads, and urban renewal projects are abandoned. Legislation
would be helpful on this point.
Because of the increasing interest in environmental concerns,
provisions relating to a hearing on and determination of the neces-
sity of the take should be evaluated. To date the absence of such
procedures has apparently not been detrimental, but an analysis
of this area may now be warranted.
Although North Dakota has no provision relating to court prefer-
ence for appropriation cases, it is doubtful whether such a statute
is necessary at this time. If the residents of the state become
more "litigation-oriented" in the future, then it may be advisable
to examine this matter.
Because of the significance of the jury view in eminent domain
cases, it is possible that North Dakota should join the thirty-one
jurisdictions with statutes on this point. Research may disclose that
the present practice is satisfactory, but this is an area deserving
inquiry. Also, the evidentiary effect of the view by jury should
be included in such a study.
As mentioned in section XX, supra, only 17 jurisdictions provide
for placing the condemnor in possession if the owner refuses to
surrender the property in question. In, the past there may have
been little need for such a provision. However, with many people
becoming more aggressive in resistance to condemnation suits,
whether a statutory writ of assistance is justified should be con-
sidered.
This work has been basically comparative and descriptive in
nature and, hopefully, has thrown some light into "the dark corner
of the law." The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has recently prepared a proposed Uniform State Con-
demnation Code. Would North Dakota benefit by adopting such a
code? Perhaps a critical analysis of the merits and demerits of
the proposed code, from North Dakota's viewpoint, should be the
subject of a future article.
